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ABSTRACT

Perpetuating Peace: Context versus Contents of the Power-sharing Agreements Between
the KDP and PUK of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 1992 and 1998
By
Brigitte E. Hugh, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2020

Major Professor: Dr. Anna O. Pechenkina
Department: Political Science
What accounts for the breakdown of peace after the 1992 50-50 Agreement versus the
deep institutionalization of peace after the 1998 Washington Agreement between the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraq’s Kurdistan
Region? In this thesis, I investigate which of the two competing scholarships—the institutionalist
versus the selection camp—has a greater explanatory power when applied to this research
question.
My analysis suggests that three independent variables played the greatest role in shaping
the observed outcomes—peace, or lack thereof—after the two agreements in 1992 and 1998.
First, the extensive learning period through conflict allowed for discovery of the exact fighting
power of each party and the spoiler status of Turkey and the PKK. Second, the agreement
language, reached through the endemic Koya/Shaqlawa peace process, provides pathways for
institutionalizing positive peace in the community. And third, the Kurds inadvertently stumbled
on one of the best ways to maintain the peace which is their separate governorates and, most

iv
importantly, the separate peshmergas, which made the end of this war more similar to that of an
interstate war than that of a civil war, and thus allowed for a more stable arrangement. These
three independent variables are divided into two extensive learning periods—wartime and
peacetime learning—which in concert ultimately account for the successful establishment of
positive peace in Iraqi Kurdistan after the Washington Agreement.
The second period, a peacetime period following 1998, enabled the two parties to learn
how to run a democratic government until such time as the incentives for the elites shifted in the
wake of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, an event which prompted them to believe cooperation
was the best path forward for the Iraqi Kurdish parties in the new Iraq.
While the context informed compliance and maintenance of the agreements, the language
of the agreements makes a difference, though not sufficient to explain peace on its own. I further
argue that the ambiguity negotiated through the endemic Koya/Shaqlawa process into the
structure of the Washington Agreement enabled the two parties to establish patterns of positive
peace in their region, culminating in the Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement
in 2006.
In summary, using a mixture of primary and secondary sources, my analysis of the case
reveals that the success or failure of the agreements is endogenous to the context in which the
parties choose to sign those agreements. Furthermore, the text of the 1998 agreement also
contributes to the absence of armed conflict after 1998, as well as the incentives to deepen
cooperation after 2003.

(120 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Perpetuating Peace: Context Versus Contents of the Power-sharing Agreements between
the KDP and PUK of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 1992 and 1998
Brigitte E. Hugh

In the mid-1990s the two Kurdish parties in Iraq—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—signed two power-sharing agreements, which had
dramatically different results. The 1992 50-50 Agreement ended in conflict while the 1998
Washington Agreement ended in long-lasting peace.
I examine both the agreements and their surrounding context to identify what explains the
success or failure of these two agreements in establishing long-lasting and cooperative peace. I
find that the presence or absence of peace is due to both the language of the agreements and the
context in which they were created. I demonstrate this through an examination of the two
learning periods the Iraqi Kurds experienced, one through fighting from 1994-1997 and the
second through a peacetime separation into two governorates from 1998-2006.
One of the most important conclusions is that the endemic Koya/Shaqlawa peace process
between the two Iraqi Kurdish parties prior to the 1998 Washington Agreement resulted in a
more ambiguous agreement in 1998 which laid the ground work for greater cooperation over the
next decade culminating in the 2006 Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement.
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INTRODUCTION

In the mid-1990s, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK), the most powerful political parties representing the Kurdish population of Iraq,
had two sequential power-sharing agreements that attempted to end the historical conflicts
between them which started in the mid-1970s. In 1992, the 50-50 Agreement ended with a civil
war between KDP and PUK. In contrast, the Washington Agreement in 1998—and its
subsequent renegotiation, the Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement in 2006—
have resulted in over two decades of peace in the region. What accounts for the breakdown of
peace after the 50-50 Agreement versus the deep institutionalization of peace after the
Washington Agreement?
In this thesis, I investigate which of the two competing scholarships has a greater
explanatory power when applied to this research question. On the one hand, the “selection camp”
puts forth that the parties strategically select themselves into an agreement based on the
contextual learning that precedes negotiations. Therefore, agreements have no independent effect
on peace but merely reflect the expectations of the parties that elected to sign them. On the other
hand, the “institutionalist camp” argues that the content of agreements has an additional,
independent impact on the durability of peace. My analysis shows that contextual factors explain
most of why peace succeeded or failed after the signing of these agreements, but that the
language of these agreements also contributed to deepen the peace from a negative peace (the
cessation of hostilities) to a positive peace (depth of cooperation between the parties.)
Analyzing the agreements brokered during the 1990s in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq
(KRI) through the selection prism, one should ask: since the parties strategically selected
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themselves into an agreement, could we attribute any subsequent peace to the language of the
agreement itself? That is, a high degree of compliance with agreements among states (or protostates) is expected because the actors are voluntarily choosing to sign agreements based on their
expectations of what arrangement can last, so agreements are merely “scraps of paper.” 1 My
analysis indeed yields that the language of the agreements cannot be divorced from the
circumstances in which they came about. The history, current events, and personalities involved
are critical to understanding the impact and acceptance of the negotiations as well as the
components of the substantive deal agreed upon.
Relying on the selection lens, I suggest two major takeaways for how contextual factors
shaped war and peace between KDP and PUK. The first conclusion of my case study analysis is
that the intermittent fighting between 1994 and 1997 and the subsequent prolonged one-on-one
negotiations from 1998 to 2006 provided two extensive learning periods during which the PUK
and KDP discovered three important things.
First, they were evenly matched at nearly every level even and especially with the
assistance of international and regional governments. The expectations of the two parties as to
who was more popular and powerful in the region were ill-informed before the 1992 deal
because the two parties had never fought one another. This uncertainty about which side would
prevail in a military contest muddied the waters just long enough to suggest to both parties that
they were the more powerful actor, causing dissatisfaction with the 50-50 Agreement from its
inception. Additionally, the PUK found flaws in the Agreement as it did not guarantee the
transparency in the creation of the budget, and since most of the Kurdistan Regional

1

Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?,” 370–82;
Werner and Yuen, “Making and Keeping Peace,” 262; Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International
Cooperation.”
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Government’s (KRG) money came from trade in the KDP regions, the PUK was concerned that
the KDP might not share revenue equally, and as a result grow more powerful.
Second, the conflict period provided time to come to understand the status of the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Turkey, and, to a certain extent, Iran as spoilers for the peace
process between the KDP and the PUK. Prior to the establishment of the KRG, external backers,
specifically Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, saw the Iraqi Kurdish parties as pawns to be used in
their attacks on Baghdad. In the wake of the establishment of the KRG in 1992, Turkey and Iran,
began to view Iraqi Kurdistan as a threat to their regional autonomy, fearing that Iraqi Kurdish
success would incite rebellions from Kurdish minorities within their own borders. Turkey was
already acutely aware of this possibility as their insurgent Kurdish party, the PKK, fled to Iraqi
Kurdistan during this period. The eventual exclusion of Turkey and PKK from the negotiation
process was a major positive development towards peace. My analysis of the case reveals that
without the interference of Turkey and the PKK, the armed conflict between the KDP and PUK
would have concluded far more speedily than it did.
Third, after learning their true relative parity of power and excluding third parties with
spoiler incentives from meddling in the negotiation process, the KDP and PUK were able to
enter a second learning period during and after the endemic peace process which began between
them in December 1997 and continued until June 1998. Historical accounts of this period largely
overlook its contribution towards the US-brokered peace process in September 1998. Most
accounts of the war simply do not mention it at all, and Stansfield 2010, the only author who
dwells on the Koya/Shaqlawa peace process, places less weight on these early negotiations,
emphasizing the role of the United States in the 1998 Washington Agreement. My analysis, by
contrast, suggests that without the early groundwork laid by the Koya/Shaqlawa negotiations, the
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Washington Agreement would not have been as reflective of the true parity between KDP and
PUK and thus less effective for establishing and maintaining peace.
My second major conclusion is that the deeper integration between the KDP and PUK
started in response to the US altering incentives for these proto-states. The US invasion of Iraq in
2003 created a major opportunity for greater regional autonomy for the Iraqi Kurdistan region;
this external shift altered the incentives of the KDP and PUK elites and allowed for deeper
cooperation and the emergence of positive peace as evidence by the 2006 Unification agreement.
That is, the collapse of a more authoritarian Ba’athist regime in Iraq and the intent to establish a
more democratic government provided an opening for the Kurds to take a more prominent role in
Iraqi politics, and in order to do so they felt they needed to present a more legitimate and
trustworthy face to the Iraqi government and the world writ large.
In short, relying on the “selection” lens to analyze this case suggests that learning about
each other and external spoilers through warfare and negotiations allowed the KDP and PUK to
voluntarily select themselves into a 1998 deal that was far more reflective of the true distribution
of power between them. That is, these factors largely explain the negative peace (i.e., the absence
of warfare between them). Additionally, the US invasion of Iraq altered the incentives of KDP
and PUK such that both sought deeper cooperation or the positive peace in order to present a
unified front to a nascent Iraqi government and the international community, and pursued such
through negotiations for further agreements.2
An opposing camp argues that although circumstances engender a mutual understanding
which allows opponents to select themselves into an agreement that reflects their expectations of

2

For the difference between positive and negative peace, see Galtung, “Toward a Grand Theory of Negative and
Positive Peace: Peace, Security, and Conviviality,” 92, 99; Galtung and Fischer, “Positive and Negative Peace,” 99.
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what deal shall endure at the end of conflict, the provisions of the agreement may further clarify
and incentivize cooperation—or lack thereof—in the case of resurgent grievances. For instance,
agreements may specify enforcement mechanisms that foster trust and increase costs of restarting
war.3 Additionally, agreements may reduce uncertainty about intentions behind the opponent’s
actions, thus controlling the damage from accidental violations.4
I examine the 1992 and 1998 deals through this lens. To be clear, a mere signing of a
power-sharing agreement does not guarantee peace, as illustrated by the 1992 50-50 Agreement,
plagued by disagreements about revenue sharing and misunderstandings about the true
popularity and power of each group. Instead, what makes a difference is what types of powersharing provisions the sides were able to agree upon. In those cases when the parties agree on
their mutual strength and do not fear the future (the prerequisites for successful bargaining),
power-sharing agreements shall reflect the accurate mutual expectations of a hypothetical
military contest, perhaps, even contributing to the emergence of positive peace—the presence of
harmony and cooperation—by giving rise to a joint project of “we-culture” in the community.
Examining the case through the institutionalist prism, I found that contents of these
agreements differed dramatically. The 1992 deal was specific in outlining the governing
structure: e.g., each of the ministries was to be staffed by a minister and deputy from opposing
parties. By contrast, after two extensive learning periods through warfare and through one-onone negotiations, the 1998 deal was purposefully ambiguous in reference to the executive
structure, that ambiguity allowed for separate, parallel governorates, and separate parallel armies
for the KDP and PUK. The second deal also included a built-in ability to renegotiate and

3
4

Fortna, “Scraps of Paper?,” 342.
Fortna, 342.
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continue to alter the agreement as deemed necessary which was crucial to creating enduring,
positive, and institutionalized peace.5 Therefore, contrary to the expectations of the
institutionalist literature, the more specific deal failed while the more ambiguous one survived.
Does it mean that the contents of these agreements had no effect on the subsequent war
and peace? The evidence suggests that this variation in the chosen language of the agreements is
easily explained by the events preceding each deal. Therefore, my major conclusion is that the
context surrounding these agreements influences and aids the language of the agreements when
explaining the outcomes of war and peace between the KDP and PUK. Nonetheless, the strategic
ambiguity and the creation of renegotiation mechanism played a necessary, but not sufficient,
role in shaping the eventual readiness of the KDP and PUK elites to deepen their cooperation
when the US upended the political order in Iraq.
In summary, using a mixture of primary and secondary sources, my analysis of the case
reveals that the success or failure of the agreements is endogenous to the context in which the
parties choose to sign those agreements. That is, the contextual variables mostly explain the
presence of active conflict after 1992 and its absence after 1998, as well as the incentives to
deepen cooperation after 2003; additionally, the text of the Washington Agreement also
contributed to the deepening of cooperation post-1998.

5

“Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement,” January 21, 2006.
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Scope Conditions

The two Kurdish Parties are not recognized by the United Nations as states. This raises
the question of the scope conditions that my findings have for other cases of postwar peace.
Structurally, these actors are operating as proto-states, that is each controls a specific territory,
regulates the population residing there, enjoys the monopoly of force to tax the population, and
deploys the taxed resources for its protection from challengers—thus, according to Wagner’s
(2000) definition of a state, both the KDP and the PUK are unrecognized states.6 Given that both
sides still keep their standing armies (“peshmerga”), the end of the armed conflict between them
resembles that of an interstate war rather than a civil conflict, in which one side is expected to
disarm. Thus, the findings from this case study could apply to weak states that are not regional
powers and, thus, are susceptible to influence by outside actors.
Additionally, the Kurds represent a rare case of the same ethnic group being divided by
political conflict. In this sense, this case is similar to Vietnam and Korea. Both south Asian
countries were divided by an internecine conflict plagued by the influence of powerful global
and regional external actors. The example of Iraqi Kurdistan can provide some insights as to how
a thoughtfully created power-sharing agreement can provide a pathway towards reunification in
the future for ethnic groups similarly plagued by conflict.

6

Wagner, “Bargaining and War.”
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Case Selection: Why the Kurds of Iraq?

The KRI has been an independently administered region in northern Iraq since 1992
characterized by a power-sharing government, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG),
between the two dominant parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK.) The region has been relatively peacefully run by these coexisting, but
politically opposed parties since a ceasefire in 1997 and the subsequent Washington Agreement,
a power-sharing agreement brokered in 1998. This peaceful period followed an initial (failed)
power-sharing agreement (50-50 Agreement) which was established after elections in 1992 and
ended when an armed conflict erupted between the two parties in 1994.7
The KRI is not a state, and most, if not all, theories on the topics of war and
peacebuilding are developed to examine state level interactions. Application of these theories to
the KRI is justified because of its unique situation as a fairly robust, state-like entity in the region
with complicated party systems, elections, and functional government which often outperforms
the national government of Iraq. Gareth Stansfield notes that the Iraqi Kurds have been afforded
the opportunity to run a fairly autonomous region for so long that their structures have aspects of
state characteristics which make it a good candidate for study using theories usually applied to
states.8 Additionally, the Kurds developed the first modern regional government in Iraq which
had democratic characteristics, making it an all the more interesting topic for study.

7

Jameel, “A Case Study of Political Corruption in Conflict-Affected Societies (The Kurdistan Region of Iraq 200313),” 77–78, 80; Waisy, “The Roots of the Iraqi Kurdish Internal Rivalries, Conflicts and Peace Process 19642000,” 222–23; Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 48; Černy, Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and
International Relations, 190, 192; Gunter, “The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq,” 233; Gunter, “Kurdish
Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 33–34; Makovsky, “Kurdish Agreement Signals New U.S. Commitment.”
8
Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 13.
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The Kurdish situation is even more intriguing for a study of power-sharing agreements
because the parties signed two similar agreements within a short period of time, one ending in
war and the other bringing long-lasting peace. These contrasting outcomes of seemingly similar
agreements present a puzzle that merits study.
Furthermore, an endemic process for peace negotiations began in 1998 and while
formalized by the 1998 Washington Agreement, these negotiations did not simply end. There has
been at least one formal renegotiation that ended in a signed deal between the parties in 2006—
the Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement—which further integrated and
formalized the executive relationship between the two major parties.9

Thesis Structure

This thesis is organized as the following. The first chapter presents a brief history of the
Kurdish Region of Iraq. The second chapter reviews the pertinent political science literature on
why peace succeeds or fails. With this background, I begin my analysis of the conflict between
the Kurdish parties. I analyze the impact of the context leading to, and the language of, the

9

A note about spelling and terms
English transliterations of certain Kurdish proper names have many different spellings. In the interest of consistency,
I have chosen one spelling for some of these words:
• Erbil: also known as Irbil, Arbil, Hawler, and Hewler
• Sulaymaniyah: also known as Sulaimaniya, Slemani, Suleimaniyah
• Masoud Barzani: Ma’sud Bar’zani (leader of the KDP)
• Dohuk: also known as Duhok
• Koya: also known as Koysanjaq, Koye
• Shaqlawa: also known as Seqlawe
Certain terms are found to have different iterations across the literature. In the case of the 50-50 Agreement (1992),
it is referred to as the 50-50 deal and the 50-50 system across different analyses and histories.
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agreements (the independent variables) on the presence and quality of peace (the dependent
variables) after the 50-50 Agreement (1992) and the Washington Agreement (1998). The final
chapter discusses the contribution of this project to our understanding of why the 1998
agreement survived while the 1992 agreement failed.

11

I
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
KURDS IN IRAQ (1941-1998)

Figure 1: Map of Iraqi Kurdistan in 199810

10

“Atlas of Iraqi Kurdistan - Wikimedia Commons.”, map edited by the author
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1941-1958—Organizing the Kurdish Revolutionary Spirit in Iraq and Iran

Summary
Starting in the 1940s, the Iraqi Kurds, alongside their Iranian counterparts, worked to
create parties that brought several tribes together. In Iran, this culminated with the short-lived
Kurdish Republic of the Mahabad. In Iraq, this period of organization was characterized by the
formation of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and various revolutionary activities against
the Iraqi government that resulted in Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s expulsion from Iraq. During the
decade of Mulla Mustafa’s exile, the KDP engaged in infighting.

Timeline of Events
The Kurds found in the northern part of Iraq have engaged in extensive revolutionary
activity against the governments that have nominally controlled their territory. Until the 1940s
this activity had taken place in loosely cooperative tribal configurations, but in the wake of the
Treaties of Sèvres (1920) and Lausanne (1923)—which included the first promises of autonomy
for Kurdistan region before stripping that hope away—the Kurds in Iraq began to bring the tribes
together into larger party-like groups.11
The first real party was founded underground by Rafiq Hilmi in 1941, it was called the
Hiwa12 (Hope) party. Membership in the party spanned the political spectrum from left to right
among the Kurdish urban intellectuals, but did not manage to draw in rural membership which

11
12

Hannum, “Chapter 9: The Kurds,” 183–84.
Also spelled “Heva”
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proved to be its weakness. It collapsed in 1945 paving the way for the Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP.)13
The current status of politics in Iraqi Kurdistan stem from one main figure, Mulla
Mustafa Barzani,14 a member of the highly revered Barzan clan, who rose to prominence during
the 1940s. Due to revolutionary activities, Mulla Mustafa was placed under house arrest by the
Iraqi government in 1941 and escaped two years later in 1943.15 At that time, Mulla Mustafa
fomented a rebellion against the Hashemite Iraqi King.16 The “Barzani Rebellion” continued for
another two years until Mulla Mustafa was forced to flee to Iran in 1945.17
While in Iran, Mulla Mustafa was party to the establishment of the Kurdish Democratic
Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. In September 1945, Qazi
Mohammad, leader of the Iranian Kurds, and other officials established the Kurdish Democratic
Party of Iran in preparation to declare the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in northwest Iran on
December 15, 1945. The Republic was a relatively short-lived experiment in autonomous rule
lasting only one year, but it provided a blue print for future Kurdish autonomous movements.18

13

Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 138; Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq, 9.
Due to the sheer number of Barzani’s which will populate this history, Mulla Mustafa Barzani will hereafter be
referred to as Mulla Mustafa.
15
Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 16.
16
“Kurdish Nationalism in the Middle East,” 2.
17
Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 16.
18
Roosevelt Jr., “Chapter 4: The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad,” 140–42, 182; Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the
Kurds, 192–93.
14

14

Figure 2: Map of Kurdish Republic of Mahabad and Autonomous Republic of
Azerbaijan, 1945-194619

19

“Atlas of Iraqi Kurdistan - Wikimedia Commons.”
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During this time, on recommendation from Mulla Mustafa, and modeled after the KDPI,
the Kurdish Democratic Party (later renamed the Kurdistan Democratic Party)20 was formed in
Iraq on August 16, 1946, with Mulla Mustafa elected president in absentia. The party was
formed from the remnants of four previous parties, including the Hiwa party.21
After the fall of the Mahabad Republic, Mulla Mustafa and his troops were forced to
withdraw to the Soviet Union, in what has been termed the “Retreat of the Five Hundred,” where
they remained until 1958.22 During Mulla Mustafa’s Soviet exile, the Kurds and the Iraqi
government did not engage in skirmishes or battles, passing a relatively quiet decade. However,
there was quite a bit of internal political struggle between factions of the KDP.
Shortly after the collapse of the Mahabad Republic, Ibrahim Ahmed, a progressive
socialist, joined the KDP in Iraq and took on a leadership role in the party, in which he leveraged
his organizational know-how to get the KDP off the ground as a functional party. Ahmed
provided the structure while Mulla Mustafa’s name and affiliation provided the legitimacy the
party needed to establish itself.23
In 1951, Ahmed was elected the secretary general of the KDP, a party which, partly due
to his influence had come to be dominated by the intelligentsia.24 During this period, Ahmed and
Hamza Abdullah (Mulla Mustafa’s representative in the party) and their respective factions often

20

Aziz, The Kurds of Iraq: Ethnonationalism and National Identity in Iraqi Kurdistan, 67; Gunter, Historical
Dictionary of the Kurds, 190–91.
21
Schmidt, Journey Among Brave Men, 119; Vanly, “Chapter 5: Kurdistan in Iraq,” 164; Gunter, Historical
Dictionary of the Kurds, 190–91.
22
Vanly, “Chapter 5: Kurdistan in Iraq,” 163–64; “Kurdish Nationalism in the Middle East,” 3.
23
Anderson and Stansfield, Gareth R. V., The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?, 165; Gunter,
Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 190.
24
Anderson and Stansfield, Gareth R. V., The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?, 165.
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struggled with one another with regard to the overall goals and policies of the KDP.25 The
struggle between Ahmed’s leftist faction and Barzani’s traditionalist faction would continue
within the KDP until 1975 when the parties split, which will be discussed later. Not only was this
a struggle between ideas, but it is said that when Ahmed and Mulla Mustafa met in 1958, Mulla
Mustafa seemed to take an immediate disliking to Ahmed, demonstrating interpersonal friction.26

1958-1970— Iraqi/Kurdish Collaboration turned to the Kurdish “War of Liberation”

Summary
Though the period of Iraqi Kurdish history starting in 1958 began with a promising
collaboration between a new Republic of Iraq and the KDP that brought Mulla Mustafa back to
Iraq, that cooperation only lasted until 1961. Baghdad’s attacks on the Kurdistan region
prompted the launch of the “War of Liberation” which saw five total Kurdistan Wars, four of
which took place between 1961 and 1970.

Timeline of Events
In July 1958, Abdul Karim Qassim,27 an Iraqi army officer, not a Kurd, overthrew the
Iraqi monarchy and proclaimed the Republic of Iraq.28 Because his campaign was supported by

25

Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 190.
Schmidt, Journey Among Brave Men, 123.
27
Also spelled Qasim or Kassem.
28
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the KDP, Qassim legalized the party and welcomed Mulla Mustafa back to Iraq in October 1958,
where he assumed the position of KDP president in person.29 However, this cooperation with the
new republic was short lived as Qassim attempted to assert his authority through military
dictatorship and did so by attacking other political parties. In 1960, his efforts turned towards the
Kurds and on September 9, 1961 these efforts culminated in air bombardment against
Kurdistan.30
Qassim’s actions in 1960 and 1961 prompted the Kurdish Revolution of 1961 which
launched the longest and most sustained period of military and political engagement against the
Iraqi government in the history of Kurdish movements, also known as “The War of Liberation.”
The revolution sought to gain some measure of autonomy and freedom from the Iraqi
government and lasted until 1975.31
However, even leading into this period of conflict, the KDP was witnessing infighting.
By 1960, the KDP Politburo, the leftist faction led by Ahmed and Ahmed’s son-in-law Jalal
Talabani, only recognized Mulla Mustafa’s leadership out of political necessity and their
infighting often precluded even their resistance against the bombardment from Baghdad.32 For
the first three months of the struggle against Qassim which started in 1961, Ahmed and
Talabani’s KDP Politburo refused to take part. It wasn’t until December of 1961 that they
stepped up their efforts.33
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The Great Kurdish Rebellion (1961-1963), or the Second Kurdistan War, came to an end
when the Ba’ath party eliminated Qassim and signed a cease-fire with Mulla Mustafa, which he
signed before consulting the KDP Politburo and ultimately led to increased distrust.34 Following
this action, both KDP factions expelled each other, and then reunited until their permanent
divorce in 1975.35 Meanwhile, the ceasefire between the Kurds and the Ba’ath party was short
lived. After internal fighting, the Ba’athist factions which originated the coup, reestablished the
Iraqi Republic, this time under the rule of President ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif.36 The ceasefire ended
in 1965 after the president of Iraq launched a spring offensive against the Kurds. The Third
Kurdistan War would continue until June 15, 1966 when a new ceasefire was reached.37
On July 17, 1968, a revolution in Baghdad brought the Tikriti Ba’athists to power again,
this time for a tenure that would see the rise of Saddam and stay in power until 2003.38
Following the Ba’athist ascension to power, a Fourth Kurdistan War was launched in April
1969.39 In 1970, the Ba’athist party, headed by Saddam, approached the Iraqi Kurds—at this
time still a seemingly unified KDP—to build a peace agreement.
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1970-1975—March Manifesto, Law of Autonomy, the Fifth Kurdistan War, and Party
Splintering

Summary
Saddam’s negotiations with the Kurds in 1970 enabled the KDP to draft the best
agreement ever offered to the Kurds, the March Manifesto. For four years, the Kurds were
granted de facto autonomy by Baghdad, until 1974 when they were presented with a watereddown version of the March Manifesto, The Law of Autonomy. The KDP rejected the latter and
again fought Baghdad in the Fifth Kurdistan War. When Iran and Iraq signed the Algiers
Agreement in 1975, Iran withdrew their support of the Kurdish rebellion, which led to its
collapse. As the rebellion crumbled, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) splintered from the
KDP.

Timeline of Events
In effect, vice president Saddam Hussein gave the Kurdish parties carte blanche to design
a satisfactory peace agreement between the Iraqi government and themselves in 1970.40 The
resultant March Manifesto (March Agreement) was the best deal ever offered to the Kurds in
Iraq, allowing them autonomy over their region in Northern Iraq, Kurdish as an official language
in Iraq, Kurdish education and culture reinforced, and Kurds involvement in all levels of
government, etc.41 The agreement, though never fully implemented, temporarily suspended a
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decade of conflict which had resulted in 60,000 casualties for both the Kurds and the Iraqi
Government as well as displacing 300,000 people, mostly Kurds.42
The period that followed, from 1970-1974, has been referred to as a “golden era” for the
Kurds in which they were largely left untouched by the central government in Baghdad and were
able to learn the skills of local administration and direct governance which provided them a
foundation on which to build when they would be afforded this opportunity again in 1991.43
However, by 1974 Baghdad had concluded that it could not accept the full terms of the
March Manifesto and drafted a watered-down version of the agreement, the Law of Autonomy
(Act 33 of 1974) which was presented to Mulla Mustafa without prior approval or agreement
from the KDP.44 Mulla Mustafa was expected to comply within 15 days. Instead, he prepared to
fight, drawing 60,000 peshmerga and 60,000 irregular fighters into the Fifth Kurdistan War with
90,000 Iraqi forces.45
At the beginning of this conflict, the Kurds were supported by the Iranians, but the
conflict ended after the March 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iran and Iraq in which Iran
agreed to withdraw their support from the Kurds.46 Without Iranian support, the Kurdish front
ultimately collapsed, and with it the formalized conflict between the government and the Kurds
which began in 1961 ended.47 Following the end of conflict, Mulla Mustafa fled to America for
treatment of his cancer, where he would stay until his death in 1979.48
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In Mulla Mustafa’s absence, as well as the shadow of failed revolution, the internal
struggles between the leftist coalition and the more conservative coalition of the KDP came to a
head and the party splintered into several pieces. At this time, Mulla Mustafa’s two sons, Idris
and Masoud Barzani formed the KDP/Provisional Command (which would retake the name KDP
in 1979), and Jalal Talabani, Ahmed’s protégé, formed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).49
These two parties endure as the main political influences in Iraqi Kurdistan today.

1975-1991—Kurdish Infighting, Chemical Attacks, and the Iraqi Kurdistan Front

Summary
In the few years following 1975 and before the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980,
the PUK and the KDP engaged in an intense power-struggle to become the dominant Iraqi
Kurdish power. However, as the war began, both parties saw it as their opportunity to assert
power in the Northern part of Iraq and waged parallel but separate attacks against Baghdad. In
1987, Tehran brokered an agreement between the two Kurdish parties that led to the
establishment of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front in 1988, just as Iraq began the Anfal campaign, a large
anti-Kurdish military operation that included the use of chemical weapons (the most notable
attack occurred in March 1988 at Halabja.)
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Timeline of Events
During the first years of reorganizing the Kurdish parties following the disastrous fallout
from the Fifth Kurdistan War, the PUK and KDP were engaged in an intense power-struggle
which was often backed by external actors and consisted of guerrilla warfare. Between 1975 and
1979, more effort was committed to fighting each other for power than was expended towards
fighting the regime as had been done in the past.50
As the Iran-Iraq war began in 1980, both Kurdish factions saw it as an opportunity to
assert their own hold on the northern part of Iraq and force the government to grant meaningful
autonomy. In doing so, each retained alliances: the KDP with the new Iranian government
headed by Khomeini and the PUK rotated through several alliances during the war, Syria, Iraq
and finally Iran.51
During the war, there were multiple popular Kurdish uprisings in 1982, 1984, 1985, and
1987 which were leveraged by the Kurdish parties, though never in cooperation, in order to
strike out against the Iraqi government.52 In 1983, the Ba’ath government worked with the PUK
to sign a ceasefire in an effort to stop the KDP’s coordinated attacks with the Iranians. Instead of
stopping the attacks, this only further polarized the Kurdish national movement.53
From 1985 to 1988, the Kurdish movement effected the most sustained pressure against
the government since the 1975 collapse.54 As a result, the Iraqi government perpetuated largescale genocidal acts in 1988 to keep the Kurds in check. In 1987, ‘Ali Hasan al-Majid was
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declared the absolute ruler of the north by Saddam and perpetuated a chemical punishment
campaign against the Kurds which became known as the Anfal campaigns.55 From February to
September 1988, the eight stages of the Anfal campaign resulted in large scale chemical weapons
attacks, physical destruction of villages, and the transfer of Kurds out of the Kurdish
heartlands.56
However, it was the Halabja Massacre in March of 1988 that earned ‘Ali the nickname
“Chemical Ali.” Halabja is one of the single most important events to the Iraqi Kurds and is
sometimes described as “Hiroshima of the Kurds” as it is the largest chemical warfare attack
since World War I. In one day, some 5,000 civilians of all ages were killed or wounded by a
chemical cocktail made up of four kinds of gas including mustard and sarin.57 Halabja became a
large affair because, unlike the rest of the chemical attacks, Iranians witnessed and reported the
attack providing evidence to the world of the attacks on the Kurds.58
In part due to the increased antagonism from the Iraqi government, and also out of
necessity, the PUK and KDP established a tolerance for one another and both initiated actions
against the government without interference from the other party in the late 1980s.59 By 1987,
Iran was supporting both Kurdish parties and managed to bring them together and help them
develop a working relationship. In July, the KDP, PUK, and four smaller parties announced the
Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF), which was formally established in May 1988. The IKF had little
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consequence during the 1980s but gave the impression of unity and later played an important
role when it came time to organize the autonomous region in 1991. 60

1991-1998—Establishing and Fighting Over an Autonomous Region

Summary
In the early 1990s, the KDP and PUK parties continued to maintain a tenuous alliance
that, in the wake of the US establishing a no-fly zone, extended to the development of elections
for an autonomous region. However, this cooperation ended in 1994 when armed conflict ignited
between the two parties and continued intermittently for the next four years, in what has been
called the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War.

Timeline of Events
This tenuous relationship continued from 1987 until 1994, even as the United States
established the no-fly zone over northern Iraq in 1991 after the first Gulf War. The third-party
enforced no-fly zone afforded the Kurds in Iraq a unique and exciting opportunity to develop
their own governance system free from military interference from Saddam who was preoccupied
trying to maintain control and rebuild the rest of Iraq in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War and the
First Gulf War.61
In 1992, the KRI held its first general election. Largely seen as free and fair by the
outside world it resulted in an extremely close margin between the two parties: the KDP received
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50.22 percent and the PUK received 49.87 percent of the vote to allocate seats within the
Kurdistan National Assembly. The margin between the two presidential candidates was even
closer.62 Because both parties were so close in every measure of power and the margin was so
small for election results, they came to a power-sharing agreement which split all power almost
directly down the middle. This did require that the KDP give up some power, but on the whole,
the outcome gave equal amounts of control to both sides. However, this 50-50 Agreement did
not prevent conflict between the two parties for long. For reasons that will be discussed at length
in this thesis, the two Kurdish parties were engaged in a low-intensity, but prolonged conflict
with one another by 1994.63
After three years of conflict and attempted negotiations, the conflict ended in 1998 after
extensive negotiations brokered by the United States. The Washington Agreement, signed by the
leaders of the KDP and the PUK in September of 1998, re-established the cooperative Kurdish
National Assembly (KNA) and because of the ambiguous language, led to two executive seats of
power each administered by one party.64 This power-sharing agreement was later renegotiated in
2006 such that the executive branch was once more unified and included some measures for
ensuring the continued power-sharing of the two parties within the branch.65
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II
LITERATURE REVIEW: THE BARGAINING
APPROACH TO WAR AND PEACE

To understand why peace succeeds or fails, one must first understand why wars begin.
The bargaining approach suggests that the recipe for war is a grievance between two parties
accompanied by a bargaining failure. Grievances exist long before war breaks out and thus
cannot be the cause of war. The bargaining failures that lead to war—the information problem
and the commitment problem—are often the same problems that lead to a breakdown of peace.66
In the information problem, one or both parties have incentives to misrepresent their
capabilities or resolve in order to achieve a better deal. This problem leads to war when one or
both sides mistakenly believes that they can prevail in a war. In peace, the information problem
can lead to a resurgence of war for similar reasons, i.e. if at least one party is overly optimistic
about its relative strength or resolve.67
The commitment problem is a situation in which the two sides are unable to settle on a
mutually beneficial bargain today because the relative power in the dyad could shift in such a
way that creates incentive for at least one side to renege on today’s deal in the future.68 In civil
wars this problem is particularly acute since rebel actors are often required to disarm as a
prerequisite for civil war settlement: by giving up their military leverage, rebels will become
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vulnerable to government reneging tomorrow on its own promises of amnesty today.69 The
commitment problem undermines peace when relative power is shifting such that one side has
the potential to grow rapidly (due to the development of specific weapons or acquisition of
strategic territory, for instance). This anticipated unfavorable shift in power puts the growing
side in a position to demand more or renegotiate the present-day bargain in the future, which
makes war today more attractive for the relatively declining opponent.70
Given this explanation of the bargaining approach to war, I explore the situation between
the Kurdish parties. The conflict is referred to as the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War; however, it is not a
traditional civil war in which there are power asymmetries between a state and rebel group. At
the time of the conflict, the PUK and the KDP were relatively well-matched with respect to
resources and international backers.71
At the time that conflict began, the two biggest cities were under the control of opposite
parties, the PUK in Sulaymaniyah and the KDP in Erbil, in effect splitting the territory and the
population in half. Additionally, there wasn’t a “state” power or a “rebel” power because the two
parties began the conflict during the process of developing a functional regional government for
the first time.72 As a result, this conflict does not meet the definition of a typical civil war;
nonetheless, I will be using the label "Kurdish Civil War” as that is what it is called in the
historical record.
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I posit that the commitment problems often found in civil wars—that the stronger power
has no incentive to respect the terms of the peace agreement once the weaker group’s military
forces have disbanded—is not present in this case, in part because even in 2020 the parties still
control their own separate peshmergas,73 so there is no commitment problem that could stem
from either party’s fears of disarmament. Thus, the decision to keep separate peshmergas after
1998 has been helpful for maintaining peace between the two parties as it makes the end of this
conflict more akin to an interstate war than a traditional civil war.74 Even in 2010, when moves
were finally made to combine the peshmergas, it was to create Regional Guard Brigades (RGBs)
which are joint PUK-KDP units of about 40,000 peshmerga fighters each, and are in addition to
the party units.75

Fighting is Learning
The general bargaining framework has spawned many explanations for why peace
endures and what circumstances will ameliorate the information and commitment problems that
could otherwise lead to the recurrence of war. I will explore four of these more thoroughly:
aspects of the war process; third party influence; and peace agreements, in two categories—those
that provide uncertainty reducing measures and those that implement peace institutionalization
measures.
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War Process
Some scholars, part of the “selection camp” argue that there are features of the war
process which correlate with the durability of peace. Since absolute wars, or wars that end in
complete destruction of one combatant, are relatively few, Wagner posits that warfare itself
represents a bargaining process as it helps identify parameters for negotiation, so that most wars
end as limited instead of absolute wars.76
Werner further argues that the demands made by groups are often strategically calculated
such that they expect they can receive a redistribution of goods through negotiation or through
conflict, if necessary.77 Werner points out that war is also part of the renegotiation process when
one side perceives that they might be able to gain more from a settlement by re-entering conflict,
or when the underlying issues for a conflict were not resolved by the previous outcome because
peace was imposed too early by an external party to adequately solve the bargaining problems.78
Smith and Stam argue that long wars with consistent fighting ameliorates the information
problem which initially led to war due to the revelatory nature of conflict—each battle fought
reveals more information about the true capabilities of either side of the conflict.79 Slantchev
argues that wars terminate only when fighting or negotiations reveal enough information that
they are able to coordinate expectations about the results each party expects to receive at the end
of conflict.80 Fearon and Smith and Stam additionally argue that wars that are long and/or have
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high casualties are much less likely to recur because the costs were so high the first time and
revealed information which was not available prior to the conflict.81
In the case of the Kurds of Iraq, the duration and intensity of war process cannot account
for the fragility of post-1992 peace because there was no conflict between just those two parties
before 1994; however, the duration of the war can account for the durability of peace post-1998.
The PUK and KDP had been arguing on and off since 1975, when the parties initially split, but
had not ever fought one another. This means that by 1992—when the 50-50 Agreement was
signed—the PUK and KDP would not have been aware of each other’s capabilities.82 The
decision to fight was then based in part on a mutual optimism on both sides that they could
defeat the other in combat as they had both been largely effective in waging attacks on Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq war.83
Estimates for the total number of fatalities during the Kurdish Civil War range from
2,000 to 5,000 during the three years of combat (1994-1997), with most sources agreeing it was
probably closest to 3,000. 84 On average then, the Kurdish Civil War fits the definition for war
from the Correlates of War project which specifies that there must be a total of at least 1,000
battle deaths during each year, an effective resistance, and commitment from both sides of the
conflict.85 However, it barely reaches the level to qualify as a war, so that necessarily disqualifies
this conflict from the argument that high casualties preserve the peace.
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The length of the war does provide a compelling argument here for the peace
maintenance. While three years may not seem like a long, drawn-out conflict, the Iraqi Kurdish
civil war came on the heels of almost 50 years of non-stop conflict with the government in
Baghdad. 86 Three years seems to be all that was necessary for the two parties to reveal the
information which had been unknown before the war.

Third-party Involvement
Third parties often shape war and peace, and are usually associated with the
“institutionalist camp” as they try to create the circumstances in which a peace could hold. Thirdparty involvement occurs at two key stages: (i) before the inception of peace through
pressure/coercive mediation87 and (ii) after the peace was achieved through peace guarantees or
spoiling. When external actors raise the costs of war through threats of punishment or promises
of benefits in exchange for peace, they expand the bargaining range, making peace a more
attractive option even in the presence of bargaining failures. Often, pressure for peace has a
short-term impact because in most cases third-party attention ultimately wanes and the costs they
imposed dissipate,88 though there are some notable exceptions, e.g. the US keeps the peace
between Israel and Egypt through strategically allocating economic and military aid.89
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Coercive mediation, or manipulation, as defined by Beardsley et al., is the process of a
mediator increasing immediate costs of continuing conflict and the future costs of reneging.90 In
cases of coercive mediation, agreements are often accepted more out of concern for the penalties
that could be imposed than satisfaction with the terms of the agreement. Thus, belligerents are
more likely to return to conflict after coercive mediation or pressure for peace than in the
“organic” cases where external parties did not pressure for peace during fighting.91
The peace process between the two Kurdish parties was long and arduous, but while
mediators were attempting to facilitate most of those talks, coercive measures were not used.
Additionally, the two parties were able to fight until they converged in mutual expectation of
parity enough that they started their own peace process, the Koya/Shaqlawa meetings.92
Walter shows that civil wars in particular rarely end with a peace agreement due to the
need for an agreement guarantor, an external party which will remain active to ensure
compliance by both parties. Different from, but sometimes in addition to, coercive mediators in
that they don’t manipulate the terms of the agreement, instead they ensure that both parties
continue to abide by the agreement made. Guarantors eventually tend to lose interest in
maintaining an agreement, and when they do, the chance for conflict reignition is highly likely.93
For the Iraqi Kurds, there was no designated agreement guarantor. The US and Turkish
embassy officials visited Kurdistan on June 10, 2000, almost two years after the signing of the
Washington Agreement at which time the two parties reaffirmed their commitment.94 However,
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this was the only time the US or another party played any role in the Kurdish conflict which
could approach guarantor.
Aside from being a guarantor or coercive mediator, a third party can take on the role of
facilitator for peace talks. Facilitators must be invited to aid in an agreement and as such do not
exert any pressure on belligerents, but once there, they serve as a channel of communication
among the parties. For a long time, facilitative mediation had been viewed as fostering peace by
revealing all options available to the belligerents; 95 however more recent work has exposed that
facilitative mediators cannot make the belligerents (without resorting to pressure) reveal the
information that the latter prefer to hide.96 This means that facilitative mediation cannot
precipitate peace: in the cases where facilitative mediation coincides with ceasefire, the
belligerents were ready to settle.
For the Iraqi Kurds, the US, Turkey, Iran, and the UK all served as facilitators for some
part of the peace process between the PUK and the KDP. With respect to the Washington
Agreement, the US played the role of facilitator given that the Koya/Shaqlawa Meetings during
February-June 1998 laid the groundwork for the peace process between the KDP and PUK, after
which the US facilitated the final agreement, which would be impossible without the long oneon-one negotiations between the KDP and PUK.97
The presence of peacekeepers keeps the costs of fighting high while they are present,
often, though not always, as a function of an agreement guarantor. Peacekeeping works to
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lengthen negative peace when most other attempts to keep the peace have already been made.98
Iraqi Kurdistan hosted several different groups of de facto peacekeepers, but most were not
present to keep the peace between the KDP and the PUK. The UN Guards Contingent in Iraq,
Operation Provide Comfort peace keepers, and Oil-for-food administrators were all present to
prevent Baghdad from attacking the Kurds, not to prevent the KDP and the PUK from fighting
each other.99 Once, in 1996, Turkish peace enforcers were tasked with maintaining a peace
agreement between the two parties, but they did not prevent armed conflict from recurring.100
Finally, third parties can serve as spoilers for peace, attacking in an effort to convince the
enemy that the moderates who support them are untrustworthy in an attempt to disrupt peace
talks.101 The Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) served as a classic spoiler for the peace process
between the Iraqi Kurdish parties at least once, when they attacked the KDP in order to break up
peace talks in 1995.102

Provisions of Peace Agreements (Non-power-sharing)
Still other scholars, those squarely in the institutionalist camp, argue that it is the contents
of peace agreements which make the difference between recurrence of war and the endurance of
peace. Fortna demonstrates that agreements which include measures that alter the incentives of
breaking the agreement—such as formal cease-fire agreements, peacekeeping forces, creation of
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demilitarized zones, withdrawal of forces, etc.—lengthen the peace and lessen the likelihood of a
return to conflict by increasing the cost of return war and reducing the uncertainty about
intentions and actions (information problem.) 103
Mattes and Savun come to a similar conclusion—carefully constructed peace agreements
prevent the recurrence of war by mitigating the information problem. However, Mattes and
Savun focus more on third-parties which serve as agreement guarantors as the mechanism which
can ensure that parties do not return to war.104
In examining the effects of non-power-sharing aspects of peace agreements, the selection
camp points out that the simple absence of conflict (negative peace) is not evidence that an
agreement has made a difference because the parties elected to sign the agreements and thus
likely would have maintained peace regardless. To argue that the agreement made a difference,
one must demonstrate evidence of observable effects which could not have been predicted when
the parties signed the agreement.
In the case of the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War, the Washington Agreement itself did not
include any of the conventional mechanisms tested by Fortna, and Mattes and Savun. There was
a ceasefire, negotiated in 1997, but it was not necessarily a part of the Washington Agreement,
and did not set up a formal demilitarized zone.105 Additionally, arms control and peacekeepers
were not present as part of the Washington Agreement. Although international troops were in the
region due to various humanitarian campaigns, they were not there to maintain the peace and
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ensure compliance with the agreement.106 This means that conventional peace agreement
measures are unlikely to account for the length of the peace post-1998. Additionally, while the
Washington Agreement was brokered with the aid of the United States, they did not play the role
of agreement guarantor, meaning the United States did not serve as an enforcing power to ensure
compliance of the parties with agreement stipulations.

Institutional Power-sharing Agreements (Consociationalism)
Consociationalism—the brokering of power-sharing agreements as a solution for ending
civil wars—focuses on ameliorating the commitment and information problems on an ongoing
basis after the conflict has concluded by creating a system of governance in which both parties
get a measure of control commensurate with their strength and are required to work together in
the business of governing.107 In essence, a power-sharing agreement captures many, if not all, of
the mechanisms Fortna discusses which decrease the likelihood of war, such as altering
incentives, reducing uncertainty about actions and intentions, and controlling fallout from
accidental violations.108
Hartzell argues that power-sharing agreements address the concern that one party will
ultimately gain control of a greater portion of power as the institutions are built or rebuilt.109
Furthermore, Hartzell and Hoddie demonstrate that the more diverse the power-sharing
agreement across sectors—usually political, economic, territorial, and military—the more
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enduring the peace will be.110 Therefore, power-sharing agreements—as their proponents
argue—do not simply formalize the arrangements that otherwise would have been reached by the
two sides of the conflicts (as the selection camp would argue), but influence the outcome and
likelihood of a return to conflict (as the institutionalist camp would suggest.)
Aziz argues that power-sharing agreements create conditions in which all parties are at
least partial winners, reducing the perception that elections and democratic entanglement is a
zero-sum game for a slightly weaker party.111 However, Aziz notes that power-sharing
agreements serve first to end violence, they do not then place emphasis on building
democracy.112 Aziz is not alone in this assessment of power-sharing agreements, most theorists
that study the effectiveness of power-sharing agreements for establishing peace, which is defined
as the cessation of armed conflict, or, negative peace, agree with him. What goes unexamined is
the ability for power-sharing agreements to foster collaboration between the combatant parties,
or establishing positive peace. The situation in Iraqi Kurdistan is all the more interesting because
their power-sharing agreements were geared towards achieving greater democracy within their
region, and the outcome of this agreement has been a deepening collaboration between the PUK
and KDP.
Gareth Stansfield posits that consociational theories can be used to analyze the reasons
behind the political instability in Iraqi Kurdistan in the early 1990s and the subsequent stability
of the later 1990s.113 Stansfield argues that in the short term, the natural division between the
party’s administrative regions has created an ideal situation, but that further rapprochement may
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not be successful given the internal competition and the external pressures against Kurds gaining
power. However, he does suggest that slow moving unification is not only a possibility but a
necessity for maintaining peace long-term.114
Both these arguments rest on an understanding of power-sharing agreements as powerful
in their own right, uninformed by the context in which they are created. Stansfield then misses
the selection argument, in which case the Kurdish parties might have maintained peace without
unification, or may have created a fast-moving unification because they select in to agreements
they eventually sign.
Stansfield isn’t alone in this disregard for the selection argument. Most power-sharing
theorists seem to fall more in line with an institutionalist perspective. But in order to show that
these agreements have some sort of independent impact we have to show that there is evidence
of effects that were not anticipated when the original agreements were signed.
In the case of the Kurds, we can see that the 50-50 Agreement which did not allow for
renegotiation and provides no opportunities for the parties to experience deeper collaboration
between them, or adjustment of the agreement according to changes in their context, is not
successful given the outbreak of war in 1994. As such, it is possible that the purposefully
ambiguous language of the Washington Agreement also contributed towards preserving negative
peace and deepening a ceasefire into positive peace.
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III
CASE ANALYSIS

Analytical Approach
This thesis uses a qualitative, within-case study of cooperation (or lack thereof) between
KDP and PUK that followed two cases of peace agreements (both power-sharing). This withincase variation (armed conflict after the 1992 agreement and long-term peace after the 1998
agreement) allows me to compare the effects of my independent variables (1) contextual factors,
e.g., the costs imposed by third parties, the duration and intensity of warfare, and (2) the
provisions of these agreements, ambiguity in the exact integration of structures, on my dependent
variables (1) the presence or absence of peace (negative peace) and (2) the quality of cooperation
(positive peace).
The advantage of within-case analysis lies in comparison of how the outlined
independent variables shaped war after 1992 and peace after 1998 without having to account for
the possible effects of different governing parties, cultures, and other variables which could
impact a cross-case analysis. In addition, a within-case study requires that the previous
agreements, once examined as texts, become context for future agreements.
Table 1 lists the independent variables whose impact this study examines. The three
columns separate the events of 1992 vs. 1998 vs. 2006—the three years during which major
agreements between the PUK and KDP were reached. Each row in Table 1 outlines an
independent variable. Table 1 first lists the context-related independent variables: humanitarian
campaigns, regional influences, military maneuvers, and active foreign forces in the region.
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Table 1 also includes a breakdown of content-related independent variables, i.e., the agreement
components present in (or absent from) the 1992 50-50 Agreement, the 1998 Washington
Agreement, and the 2006 Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement.

Table 1: Power-sharing Agreements in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq
50-50 Agreement (1992)
Actors

PUK/KDP
PUK/KDP
Context-related independent variables115

Negotiated by/with a
third-party

No

Regional Influences

Iran and Turkey

Humanitarian Campaigns

Military maneuvers

Foreign forces active in
region

Washington Agreement (1998)

Operation Provide Comfort
(OPC) (1991-1996)
Operation Northern Watch
(1996-2003)
No-fly zone (Operation Poised
Hammer) (1991-2003)
PKK/Turkey conflict in KRG
(1987-1999)
UN Guards Contingent in Iraq
(UNGCI) (1991-2003)
OPC forces (1991-1996)

Yes
Iran, Turkey and the Kurdistan
Worker’s Party (PKK)
Operation Northern Watch (19962003)
Oil-for-Food Program (19952003)

Kurdistan Regional
Government Unification
Agreement (2006)
PUK/KDP
No
Iran and Turkey
Oil-for-food program (ends
in 2003)

No-fly zone (1991-2003)
PKK/ Turkey conflict (1987-1999)

US invasion of Iraq (2003)

UNGCI (1991-2003)
Turkish peace enforcers (1996)
OPC forces (1991-1996)

UNGCI (1991-2003)
Oil-for-food administrators
(1995-2003)

115

Information drawn from: Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds; Brown, Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991 With Marines in Operation
Provide Comfort; “Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan: Human Rights Developments”; Nader et al., “Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan”; Gunter, “The
United Nations and the Kurds”; Mays, Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping; Černy, Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations;
Charountaki, “Turkish Foreign Policy and the Kurdistan Regional Government”; Charountaki, The Kurds and US Foreign Policy; Gibson, “The Secret Origins of
the U.S.-Kurdish Relationship Explain Today’s Disaster”; Gunter, “Turkey and Iran Face off in Kurdistan”; Jüde, “Contesting Borders?”; Leezenberg, “Iraqi
Kurdistan: Contours of a Post-Civil War Society”; Stansfield, “From Civil War to Calculated Compromise: The Unification of the Kurdistan Regional
Government in Iraq”; “Iraq Chronology of Events : Security Council Report.”

41

41

Oil-for-food administrators (19952003)
Content-related independent variables116
Party Leadership
involvement
Opportunity for
Integration
Communication between
parties
Judiciary structure
Executive structure

US and coalition forces
(2003-)

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N/A
Office of president never
activated
Ministries split 50/50 between
the parties

N/A
Language in the agreement
ambiguous, ultimately settled with
two executives

N/A

Legislative structure

50/50 split in the seats, leftover
5 to the minority parties

Assembly structure un-dictated,
elections mandated

Financial control

Not given to the government

Single Minister of Revenue and
Taxation

Unification of ministries,
Position: Vice President
created
Unchanged as to structure,
Speaker and PM given party
mandates & rotation
schedule
Yes, regional budget to be
prepared by the unified
KRG. Ministry of Finance to
unite w/in a year
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Military control

Not given to government

Elections

Unmandated

Powers given to government to
unify, action still un taken
Mandated

Police

N/A

N/A

Ministry of Peshmerga to
unite w/in a year
N/A
Supreme commission to be
established to institutionalize
policy and security agencies
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The Events of 1992 to 2006 to be Analyzed

From 1992 to 2006, the Kurds in Iraq were involved in a long series of events,
outlined in Table 3, that comprised both conflict (section 3.3.1) and peace processes
(section 3.3.2). There were nearly as many peace-building events as there were conflict
events between the two parties and outlining the full chronology of what happened in
1992-2006 helps identify how the context informed the agreements and how the
agreements informed the context.

1992-1994—Iraqi Kurdish Elections and Collaboration

The establishment of the no-fly zone in 1991 created an environment relatively
free of Saddam’s influence, so the Kurdish parties in northern Iraq agreed to hold
elections to establish an autonomous Kurdish government. The elections took place in
May 1992, and despite being run by a people who were relatively unfamiliar with
democratic traditions, they were remarkably free and fair.117
The results of the parliamentary election did not fit the expectations of either
party. The KDP who had expected to get upwards of 70 percent of the vote, ended up
with 50.22 percent. Meanwhile, the PUK had expected to receive 55 to 60 percent of the
vote and received 49.78 percent.118 Furthermore, the election numbers for president, a
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race between Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani, were too close to call and required a
second round of voting in order to select a president, but second round voting never took
place.119
In the wake of these disappointing election results for all, the Kurdish Front set
about negotiating and developed the 50-50 Agreement in an effort to keep the fledgling
democracy alive. 120 As part of the agreement, the PUK and KDP each received 50 seats
in the 105-seat Kurdish National Assembly (KNA), and the remaining five were allocated
to the Assyrian Christian minority.121 At the time of announcement of the 50-50
Agreement, Barzani and Talabani said that “the elections were a victory for everyone.”
However, later Talabani admitted that no one was truly satisfied with this outcome.122
As part of the 50-50 Agreement, the KDP was required to share revenue with the
PUK. Due to the geographic positioning of the two parties, the KDP controlled the
lucrative border crossing with Turkey, which brought in between $100,000 to $150,000
per day accounting for 85 percent of the KRG’s revenues.123 Due to Iraqi sanctions on the
Kurdistan region, much of this was illicit. The PUK was less advantageously positioned
on the Iranian border, which was not as involved in trade with Iraq, illicit or otherwise.
Therefore, the most available income for the Kurds in Iraq at this time was the border
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money from trade with Turkey, and to a lesser extent the foreign assistance programs in
the region.124
This collaboration between the two parties even extended to a joint offensive with
Turkey against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)—the Turkish Kurdish rebel group—
which was hiding in the Iraqi Kurdish territory. Turkey began the offensive on October
16, 1991, and the PUK and KDP joined on October 21, for the relatively short-lived
campaign. The PKK later surrendered to the Iraqi Kurdish Front, more specifically the
PUK on October 30.125

1994-1995—Conflict and Broken Peace Talks

In May of 1994, after much complaining about the KDP withholding funds, and
some increased dispute about land ownership, the PUK attacked.126 For one month the
KDP and PUK fought, resulting in more than 400 killed and the KDP seizing Dohuk,
Zakho, and Ammadiya from the PUK. 127 After this initial fighting, they instituted a brief
(merely hours long) ceasefire, before clashes resumed lasting until June 6. During these
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clashes, more than 600 people were killed. 128 On July 4, 1994, the KDP and PUK
announced that they were still unified against the Iraqi Government despite their clashes.
129

In part, however, these clashes may have been started because Baghdad was no longer

a unifying foe as US enforced safe haven kept Baghdad out of the Kurdish territories and
removed them as an active joint enemy to keep the PUK and KDP in cooperation with
one another.130
Shortly after the announcement, France, the UK, and the US made their first
attempts to broker peace between the KDP and PUK in Paris from July 16-22, 1994. Two
factors prevented the Paris Peace talks from brokering an agreement.131 First Turkey,
upset about global power’s intervention into their region without involving them, and
reluctant to let a Kurdish state develop, refused Talabani and Barzani the exit visas they
needed to go to Paris to sign the accords.132 Second, clashes once again broke out
between the PUK and the KDP beginning on July 19, 1994.133
Clashes continued until August 15, 1994, when the PUK and KDP reached a
ceasefire, but it was short-lived with clashes starting again less than 72 hours later on
August 17. 134 They tried again on November 21, 1994 and reached the “Alliance Pac” or
the “Year 2000 Agreement” wherein they agreed not to fight until the year 2000;
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however, this agreement lasted only until December 13, 1994 when another dispute over
tax collection sparked further conflict. During this round of fighting, the PUK captured
the village of Kasnazan near Erbil (the Iraqi Kurdish seat of government) and then
managed to take Erbil from the KDP on January 1, 1995. 135 Fighting continued until
February 17, 1995 when an informal cease fire between the PUK and the KDP ended
fighting for a few days until heavy fighting resumed from February 20-22. 136
On the eve of the Kurdish New Year (Nowruz137), Turkey launched Operation
Steel, a military operation which attacked the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan on March 20, 1995.
138

This operation lasted until May 4, and, in the middle of that offensive the PUK and

KDP clashed for four hours on March 27, 1995 resulting in 10 deaths. On April 8, 1995,
the KDP called for a temporary truce with the PUK, brokered by Turkey. 139 Turkey’s
withdrawal from Iraqi Kurdistan in May was short lived as they launched another
offensive against the PKK from July 4-11, 1995. During Turkey’s latest offensive the
PUK began to be wary of the KDP, which had been working with Turkey and launched a
preemptive attack on July 8, 1995. 140
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Late 1995—The Drogheda Talks

In June 1995, an US State Department official visited Iraqi Kurdistan to invite the
parties to talks in Ireland sponsored by the US, UK and Turkey.141 From August 11-15,
1995 the parties participated in the first session of the Drogheda talks, during which a
preliminary agreement was reached. However, the content was the same as had been the
meat of other agreements which had failed because interpretations varied between the
parties as to the meaning of certain clauses; in particular those concerning revenue
sharing—the PUK’s ongoing concern over KDP’s monopolization of the Kurd’s main
source of income along the Turkish border—and the KDP’s demands that the PUK end
military occupation of Erbil.142
In the midst of negotiations, the PKK attacked the KDP on August 26, 1995 in an
effort to break up the peace talks taking place in Ireland. The PKK knew that if the PUK
and the KDP were able to reach an agreement, their safe haven would be compromised
since the attention of the Kurds in Iraq would not be divided, and they would then be in a
position to remove the PKK from their territory.143 Combined with language which did
not address the true conflicts, the second negotiation period from September 11-15 failed
to secure an agreement of any kind.144
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After the Drogheda talks failed, Iran invited the Kurdish parties to Tehran in
October 1995 to reach an agreement. While there are reports that an agreement of some
sorts was reached, the reports are unclear as to the nature of the agreement, and on the
whole, nothing came of it.145 US sponsored peace talks resumed on November 13 and
21,1995, but they also ended without reaching an agreement.146 The US tried again on
April 18, 1996, when they sent US State Department official Robert Deutsch to Northern
Iraq to try to broker a settlement, but no agreement was reached.147

1996—Saddam’s Involvement in the Conflict

On August 16, 1996, the PUK broke the relative peace between the two parties
and attacked the KDP. As a result, the KDP turned to Saddam for support on August 22,
1996.148 On August 28, the PUK and KDP agreed to a new US brokered ceasefire and
further agreed to work towards a more comprehensive settlement. However, this only
lasted until August 31, when the Iraqi forces arrived to aid the KDP in the fight against
the PUK.149
It is with this support that the KDP was able to retain control of Erbil, which they
had lost in early 1995, and further took the PUK stronghold of Sulaymaniyah on
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September 9. The support of the Iraqi fighting forces was technically in violation of
UNSC Resolution 688, and the safe haven established by the US and allies, resulting in
US strikes in the south of Iraq.150 On October 13, the PUK, with assistance from Iran,
took back Sulaymaniyah and two other small towns just prior to the 10-point Agreement,
a ceasefire brokered by the US and Turkey on October 2. The agreement returned the
ceasefire line to the precombat location between Degala and Koysanjaq in the first of the
Ankara Process negotiations. 151

1996-1997—The Ankara Process

The Ankara process was a series of peace negotiations brokered in Turkey by the
US, UK, and Turkey in October 1996, and January, March, and May 1997.152 In the
midst of these talks, on May 14, 1997, 50,000 Turkish troops invaded Iraqi Kurdistan to
wage Operation Sledgehammer against PKK camps in northern Iraq. 153 On July 10, the
PUK withdrew from the Ankara process citing Turkish involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan
and including bias towards, and support for, the KDP. 154
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Starting in September 1997, the PKK and KDP fought resulting in considerable
losses for KDP.155 Then, on September 23, the Turkish army in cooperation with the
KDP attacked the PUK in a campaign known as “Operation Twilight.”156 The operation
ended on October 13, and Turkish troops withdrew, but on the heels of Turkish
withdrawal, the PUK launched a military campaign against the KDP known as the
“Storm of Revenge” or “Operation Vengeance Storm.”
The campaign continued for five days and was supposed to conclude on October
18 after the US brokered a ceasefire; however, the signing of the agreement was followed
by some skirmishes in which members of both sides were killed. 157 Fighting continued
between the PUK and the KDP even when the KDP declared a unilateral ceasefire on
November 24. 158

1998—The Koya/Shaqlawa Process and the Washington Agreement

In December of 1997 and January of 1998, the two Kurdish leaders, Talabani and
Barzani, begin trading letters which served as the foundation for an endemic peace
process between the two parties known as the Koya/Shaqlawa meetings.159 Historical
records indicate that increased Turkish and PKK involvement frustrated the two parties
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and they realized that their conflict was being manipulated by both parties for their own
benefit; the PKK so as to keep their safe haven and Turkey so it could continue to attack
the PKK.
On February 12, 1998 this peace process began in earnest when delegations from
both the KDP and the PUK met in Shaqlawa, the first of a series of meetings which took
place every two weeks with the location rotating between Shaqlawa in KDP territory and
Koysanjaq (Koya) in PUK territory. These meetings worked to develop confidence
building measures between the two parties including prisoner exchanges, enforcing the
ceasefire, ending media attacks and establishment of a joint committee to ensure
implementation of SCR 986 (oil-for-food).160 However the talks deadlocked over the
main issues of territory, revenue-sharing, and military in June of 1998 at which time the
meetings became much less frequent.161
In July, the US sent State Department official David Walsh to Kurdistan to invite
the two parties to a final set of negotiations meant to create a comprehensive peace
settlement. Using the Koya/Shaqlawa agreements as a baseline, the Washington talks
developed a power-sharing agreement which included measures addressing the knotty
issues that had deadlocked the previous talks. In the company of US Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, Talabani and Barzani announced the signing of the Washington
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Agreement on September 17, 1998, ending a three-year conflict that resulted in 2,0005,000 casualties on either side.162
While the Washington Agreement is on paper a power-sharing agreement meant
to unify the two parties, it was in practice a robust ceasefire agreement, at least at first.
The PUK and KDP ultimately had different governorates which they controlled and
governed separately until the 2006 Kurdistan Regional Government Unification
Agreement. Both parties also maintained their own peshmergas. 163 However, even a
veneer of cooperation and a halt to military combat through the Washington process,
enabled them to keep Turkey, the PKK and Iran out of their affairs for a time because of
US protection. In doing so, this period where both parties were administering their own
regions was helpful when unification occurred because there were double the number of
civil servants with experience to lend to the process.164

1999-2003—Challenges to the Washington Agreement

Almost immediately upon the PUK and KDP signing the Washington Agreement,
the PKK moved back into Iraqi Kurdistan territory, which put a strain on the agreement
since both parties had agreed not to provide any support to the PKK.165 The PKK
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presence continued to be a problem for implementation of the Agreement even after
Turkey captured Öcalan, the leader of the PKK in February 1999,166 because Barzani
accused the PUK of helping the PKK in April of 1999.167
Even without the added tension from the PKK, the parties continued to meet to
implement the agreement, and hold each other responsible for non-implementation, as the
PUK did in June 1999.168 On June 10, 2000 the PUK and KDP reaffirmed their
commitment to the Washington Agreement when US and Turkish embassy officials
visited Iraqi Kurdistan.169
Over the course of the next few years, the two parties operated their separate
regions, but would jointly participate in many initiatives and projects, including a joint
operation room to address terrorism in the region,170 a coalition with other Iraqi groups
on the future of Iraq in the event of a US-led military intervention,171 a joint federal
project in September 2002 that drew Turkish attention and warning,172 the Kurdistan
National Assembly resuming,173 and the opening of offices in each other’s regions as a
sign of reconciliation on February 8, 2003.174
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2003-2006—The US Invasion: The Kurds and a new Iraq

From 2000-2003, the US continued to be very involved with the Iraqi Kurds.
Including Kurdish leaders meeting with several high-ranking US officials: Vice President
Al Gore in June 2000, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in November 2000, and
President George W. Bush in April 2002.175 On August 15, 2002, Talabani even issued a
public invitation to the US and the UK to invade Iraq from PUK territory.176 And both the
KDP and PUK announced their intention to join the US invasion forces in the war on Iraq
on February 15, 2003; there was once again a reason to coalesce against a greater
enemy.177 Many scholars point to the US invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003 as crucial in
the process of normalizing relations between the PUK and the KDP.178
Post-2003 the US seems less involved in Kurdish affairs, and more involved in
Iraqi governmental affairs writ large, organizing the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA), and successors, the Iraqi Governing Council and the interim Iraqi Government.179
As such, the US does not seem to apply any undue pressure for the KDP and the PUK to
unite their governorates.
Instead, this seems to come as a result of a Kurdish codification in the Iraqi
constitution as one regional governorate with reasonable independence, and the need to
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be perceived as strong by their counterparts in the Iraqi government as well as the
international onlookers.180 The announcement of a unified KRG came mere weeks before
the announcement of a permanent Iraqi government—one on May 7, 2006 and the other
on May 20.181 While the US did not put any pressure on the Iraqi Kurdish parties towards
unification, the 2003 invasion laid the groundwork for their eventual unification.
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Table 2: Peace Negotiations in Iraqi Kurdistan (1987-2006)
Dates

Name

Initiating
party

Most recent
conflict

7/1987

Kurdistan
Front

Iran

1992

KDP-PUK

7/1622/1994

50-50
Agreement
Paris Peace
Talks

1987 Popular
Kurdish
uprising
against Iraqi
Government
N/A

US/UK

5/3/94 KDP
takes Dohuk,
Zakho &
Ammadiya

8/15/94

N/A

PUK/KDP

11/21/94

Alliance pact
(Year 2000
agreement)
Drogheda talks

PUK/KDP

Ongoing
clashes since
8/18/94
8/17/94

US, State
dept

7/8/95 PUK
preemptive

8/1115/95

Immediately Turkey
following
conflict
1990 uprising N
against Iraqi
government

UK

US

Other
Agreement
country type

N

N

Iran

Fighting
Coalition
against Saddam
Hussein

PUK attacks
5/1994
7/19-8/18/94
sporadic
clashes
between
parties

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

France
(host)

8/17/94

Yes—
doesn’t
allow
visas for
Kurdish
leaders to
sign
agreement
N

Power-sharing
peace agreement
Peace
Agreement

N

N

N

12/13/94

N

N

N

N

8/26/1995
Y
PKK attacks
KDP to break

Y

Y

Ireland
(host)

Ceasefire (lasts
less than 72
hours)
Ceasefire/peace

Preliminary
Agreement
reached
58

58

9/1115/95

Drogheda talks

official
visits 6/95
US

10/95

N/A

Iran

11/1321/95

N/A

US

4/18/96

N/A

US

10/23/96

10-Point
US
Agreement,
first phase of
Ankara process
Ankara Process US

1/16/973/11/97

attack on
KDP
8/26/1995
PKK attacks
KDP to
break up
peace talks
None
recorded
between
peace talks
None
recorded
between
peace talks
None
recorded
between
peace talks
10/13/96

None
recorded
between
peace talks

up peace
talks
None
recorded
before next
peace talks
None
recorded
before next
peace talks
None
recorded
before next
peace talks
8/16-31/96
Erbil taken
by KDP with
help from
Iraqi Forces
None
recorded
before next
peace talks
3/16/97 KDP
official
murdered,
PUK denies
responsibility

Y

Y

Y

Ireland
(host)

None reached

N

N

N

Iran

Unclear from all
reports

N

N

Y
(sponsor)

N

None reached

N

N

Y (Robert N
Deutsch
goes to
Kurdistan)

N/A

Y

N

Y

N

Ceasefire

Y

N

Y

N

Ankara
declaration

59

59

5/97

Ankara process
continued

7/10/97 PUK
withdraws
from Ankara
Process
N/A

Y

N

Y

N

None reached

2/12/98

Koya/Shaqlawa PUK/KDP
Meetings

10/13/97
Storm of
Revenge

N

N

N

N

N/A

N/A

N

N

Y

N

Meetings—>
confidence
building
measures
Powersharing/ceasefire

9/17/98

Washington
Agreement

1/8/99

N/A

US
(following
KoyaShaqlawa
Meetings)
PUK/KDP

N/A

N/A

N

N

N

N

6/10/2000 N/A

PUK/KDP

N/A

9/14/2000
PUK and
PKK fight

Y

N

Y

N

9/23/2002 N/A

PUK/KDP

N/A

N/A

N

N

N

N

2/8/2003

PUK/KDP

N/A

N/A

N

N

N

N

N/A

US

3/11/97 KDP
official
murdered

Implementation
meeting
US and Turkish
Embassy
officials visit
Kurdistan,
KDP/PUK
reaffirm
commitment to
Washington
Agreement
Publish draft
joint federal
project
KDP and PUK
open offices in
60

60

12/1/2004 N/A

PUK/KDP

3/20/2003
US invasion
of Iraq

N/A

N

N

N

N

1/21/2006 N/A

PUK/KDP

N/A

N/A

N

N

N

N

5/7/2006

PUK/KDP

N/A

N/A

N

N

N

N

Kurdistan
Regional
Government
Unification
Agreement

each other’s
regions
PUK and KDP
sign agreement
to participate in
Iraqi elections as
allies
KNA reaches
agreement to
reunify the
divided KRG
administration
Unification
agreement
added to 1998
agreement.

61

61
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Analyzing the Case through the Selection and Institutionalist Prisms

Having outlined the events of 1992 to 2006, this section presents the qualitative
examination of these events pursuing the overarching research question of this thesis: what can
account for the failure to institutionalize peace after the 1992 50-50 Agreement versus the
cultivation of positive peace after the signing of the Washington Agreement in 1998.
My analysis suggests that three independent variables played the greatest role in shaping
the observed outcomes after the two agreements in 1992 and 1998. First, the extensive learning
period through conflict allowed for discovery of the exact fighting power of each party and the
spoiler status of Turkey and the PKK. Second, the agreement language makes a difference as it
provides pathways for institutionalizing positive peace in the community. And third, the Kurds
inadvertently stumbled on one of the best ways to maintain the peace which is their separate
governorates and, most importantly, the separate peshmergas, which made the end of this war
more similar to that of an interstate war than that of a civil war, and thus allowed for a more
stable arrangement. These three independent variables are divided into two extensive learning
periods—wartime and peacetime learning—which in concert ultimately account for the
successful establishment of positive peace in Iraqi Kurdistan after the Washington Agreement.

Extensive combat learning period

The first independent variable I examine is the duration of warfare which allowed the
sides to learn their relative military capabilities and resolve. The lack of prolonged engaged
warfare between the KDP and the PUK before 1992 and the experience of intense fighting in
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1994 to 1997 influenced the failure of the 1992 agreement and shaped the duration of peace after
1998, because warfare allowed the sides to learn about each other’s military strength as well as
to learn about the intentions and resolve of their international backers as spoilers rather than
supporters of the peace process.

Evenly matched groups (Stalemate)
Prior to 1992, the KDP and PUK did not directly engage in skirmishes with one another.
There was always a greater foe, Baghdad, which drew the attention and violence of the two
parties. There was animosity between them, as seen by their reticence to create an alliance to
fight their common enemy on top of years of internecine disagreement. Towards the end of the
Iran-Iraq conflict they briefly teamed up in the Iraqi Kurdish Front which allowed them the
coalition to create the Kurdistan Regional Government in 1992.182
However, because the two parties never engaged directly with one another after they split
in 1975, they did not have a clear understanding of each other’s fighting strength in 1992. Their
long-standing animosity for each other without direct military engagement in combination with
their experience engaging militarily with Baghdad created “mutual optimism” for war in 1994.183
Because both parties had only fought the Iraqi government pre-1992, the agreement did not meet
any of their expectations. This was especially true with respects to the popularity they expected
to enjoy at the ballot box, given that reports and interviews indicate the PUK expected to win
between 55 and 60 percent of the vote while the KDP expected to receive 70 percent and the
smaller parties affiliated with the Kurdish Front also expected to do better than they did.184 Thus,
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both sides miscalculated expecting to prevail in armed conflict rather than compromising under
the 50-50 Agreement.
Engaging in skirmishes for three years with various international backers—the PUK most
often enjoying support from Iran, the PKK and Syria (for a short time), while the KDP enjoyed
support from Turkey and Baghdad185—informed the two parties that they were relatively well
matched on every level militarily.186 The PUK’s Operation Vengeance Storm in October 1997
was the final showcase for understanding that the two parties could not defeat each other, even
with the aid of international backers.187 Additionally, the conflict over the three years had simply
been a tit for tat. The PUK would seize territory only to have the KDP take it back in the next
offensive, and vice versa. In short, in a post-war Iraqi Kurdistan, the two parties understood their
limitations and they were able to reach an agreement that more fully fit their expectations.

Peace Spoilers (Turkey, PKK, Iran)
The extensive fighting period also provided an opportunity for the PUK and KDP to
come to understand the role that Turkey, the PKK, and Iran played as spoilers in their peace
process. Prior to 1992, the support from outside backers was both plentiful and welcome in the
fight against Baghdad.188 As a result, support for the parties during the conflict was not only
normal, it was expected. It took time for both parties to learn the ulterior motives that Turkey—
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who was heavily involved in Kurdish matters189—and to a certain extent Iran—as the other, less
involved regional power190—had in supporting either of the Kurdish parties.
In the wake of the Iran-Iraq war, and still trying to build a new identity as the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Iran was less involved in Iraqi Kurdish affairs than it had been in the past. But
it, along with Turkey, was still invested in whatever came of the Kurdish struggle in Iraq given
that an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan would have ripple effects among the Kurds in Iran.
This section presents the major pieces of evidence that demonstrate that Turkey, PKK,
and Iran were not interested in a peace settlement between KDP and PUK.
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Turkey
Table 4 presents the peace talks which took place between the Kurdish parties between
1987 and 2006, with specific reference to Turkey’s involvement. The most salient conclusion
from this table is that agreements in which Turkey was involved were less successful. While
those where Turkey was not a key player, such as the Koya/Shaqlawa, Washington Agreement,
and Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement were able to establish lasting peace.

Table 3: Turkish Involvement in the Iraqi Kurdish Peace Process
Dates
7/1987
1992
7/16-22/1994
8/15/94
11/21/94
8/11-15/95
9/11-15/95
10/95
11/13-21/95
4/18/96
10/23/96
1/16/97-3/11/97
5/97
2/12/98
9/17/98
1/8/99
6/10/2000
9/23/2002
2/8/2003
12/1/2004
1/21/2006
5/7/2006

Name
Kurdistan Front
50-50 Agreement
Paris Peace Talks
N/A
Alliance pact (Year 2000 agreement)
Drogheda talks
Drogheda talks
N/A
N/A
N/A
10-Point Agreement
Ankara Process
Ankara process continued
Koya/Shaqlawa Meetings
Washington Agreement
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement

Turkey
N/A
N/A
Y
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N

67
However, Turkey became much more involved in the affairs of the Kurds of Iraq during
the 90s and in the middle of the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War because its own Kurdish insurgents—
the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), formed in 1978191—were at this point taking refuge in the
Kurdish run territories in Iraq. Their presence in Iraq informed Turkey’s motivation to be the
staging ground for Operation Provide Comfort—the US-led effort to provide humanitarian
assistance to the Kurds—as it gave them free reign to go after the PKK. The US’s attention was
focused on providing aid and they were reliant on Turkey’s good will for the continuation of
their operations, a circumstance Turkey took advantage of quite frequently.192 The first and last
of these efforts to wipe out the PKK to take place before the Washington Agreement with the
assistance of both the PUK and the KDP was an offensive against the PKK in October of
1992.193
At least once during the Iraqi Kurdish Wars, an action taken by Turkey prevented the
signing of a peace agreement that could have ended the war early on. During the 1994 Paris
Peace talks, the Turkish Government did not allow Talabani and Barzani the necessary visas to
go and sign the accords, in part because Turkey was frustrated with powers such as the US and
the UK getting involved in their region.194
But Turkey’s involvement was not limited to this overt attempt to subvert the peace
process. It was involved with almost all the peace talks after Paris and before the Washington
Agreement (see Table 4), to the extent that it hosted the Ankara Process talks during 1996 and
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1997.195 During one such negotiation period in May of 1997, Turkey sent 50,000 Turkish troops
into northern Iraq to attack some PKK strongholds.196 This was an overt demonstration that they
were not committed to the peace talks they were trying to broker.
In fact, when Talabani and the PUK withdrew from the process later that summer
Talabani said, “The Ankara negotiations were foiled on 14 May because of the Turkish-Barzani
collusion and their agreement to invade Iraqi Kurdistan on the pretext of chasing terrorists.”197
Talabani’s statement further demonstrates how Turkey served as a spoiler for peace. At a time
when the country was supposedly serving as an unbiased broker for peace, Talabani notes that
“Turkey has discarded its neutral role and is now an ally of Barzani.” 198 To which Barzani
retorted that the PUK and the PKK “have made an alliance.” 199

PKK
The PKK served as a similar spoiler for peace due to their presence in the region, which
was a direct effort to take advantage of the tumult in a majority Kurdish region. The PKK often
allied itself with the PUK, as noted by Barzani, but this effort was often passive on the part of the
PUK, which simply allowed the PKK to exist in its territory, but not did provide or receive
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support from the PKK.200 For a time in the early 1990s, the PKK even allied itself with Baghdad,
its every action geared towards survival.201 In August 1995, the PKK launched an attack on the
KDP with the express purpose of spoiling the Drogheda talks which were taking place between
the KDP and the PUK in Ireland and were initially promising.202 They did so in an effort to
maintain their safe haven in Iraqi Kurdistan, which would have disappeared had the PUK and
KDP achieved peace because every agreement included provisions which would have ended any
cooperation between the PKK and the PUK. Their worries were well founded as the Washington
Agreement did strip the PKK of their safe haven.203

Iran
Iran and the Kurds have a long relationship before the Kurdish conflict. Most of Iran’s
direct involvement and support for the Kurds came during the 1980s when the two Kurdish
parties were still trying to (re)establish their reputations after the 1975 split. Iran’s eagerness to
support both parties was a result of the Iran-Iraq war, for which Iran saw the two parties as useful
proxies.204
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This relationship somewhat changed after the war, there was no need for Iran to be as
involved in Kurdish affairs, but it did maintain good relationships with both parties even
establishing the first offices in the newly established Kurdistan region in 1993.205 However, Iran
also has a substantial population of Kurds, and the establishment of an autonomous region in
Northern Iraq was as concerning to them as it was to Turkey. Thus, Iran’s involvement in
tripartite talks between themselves, Syria, and Turkey to try and prevent an autonomous
Kurdistan from 1992-1995.206 Meanwhile, Iran was one of the PUK’s most consistent, if quiet,
backers as a counterweight to Turkey’s backing of the KDP.207 Direct Iranian involvement in the
Kurdish conflict came only one time when they hosted peace talks in 1995 after the Drogheda
talks failed.208

KDP and PUK strive to overcome the spoilers’ influence
It was the PUK’s Operation Vengeance Storm in late 1997 after Turkey’s withdrawal
from Operation Sledgehammer that served as the final wake-up call to the two parties as the
Turkish backing of the KDP showed just how easily a regional power could involve itself in
Kurdish affairs.209 Additionally, the two parties recognized on a strategic level that unity (or at
least a show of it) would be better than letting their division serve as a way for regional powers
to get involved in their affairs.210 It was after the close of this offensive that they started their
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endemic peace process in the form of the Koya/Shaqlawa meetings followed by the Washington
Process which excluded Turkey as part of the peace process, eliminating them as a biased
broker.211
My analysis suggests that the Koya/Shaqlawa meetings in early 1998 did more to develop
peace between the PUK and the KDP than other scholars give them credit. Many scholars simply
don’t mention this endemic peace process, or when they do, they refer to it in passing and laud
the Washington Agreement as the US bringing an end to the conflict. However, the confidence
building measures put in place by these bi-weekly meetings did more to establish an atmosphere
of cooperation towards the establishment of positive peace than the Washington Agreement
would have been able to do on its own, even with the aid of the US. Not to mention, that the two
parties were meeting bi-weekly for five months—approximately 10 total meetings, after a series
of letters traded between their leaders—to negotiate, already establishing a pattern of negotiation
without interference from other spoiler powers like Turkey.212

Extensive peacetime learning period

My analysis shows that learning during peacetime was as important as the learning that
took place during conflict. I also argue that two independent variables influence this peacetime
learning. First, the ambiguity of the agreement language, specifically found in the Washington
Agreement, set the stage for the two parties to be able to learn more about the arrangements that
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were necessary and most useful for embedding positive peace in the community. This is in large
part due to the extensive negotiations which took place between the Kurds from December 1997
to June1998 (the Koya/Shaqlawa process) which allowed them to select themselves into
language that would most effectively maintain the peace. Second, by establishing two
governorates and keeping separate peshmergas the parties stumbled on an effective method for
preventing further combat. This because the parties were able to avoid the commitment problem
that stems from disarming in addition to their preoccupation learning how to run an effective
government.

Strategic Agreement Language
Literature on power-sharing agreements has examined them as powerful peace-keeping
measures, given that they ameliorate the commitment problem between two parties of
approximately equal strength splitting the political power according to the expectations of
each.213 These studies have focused more on ending conflict (i.e. negative peace) and less on
institutionalizing peace for the future (positive peace).
I argue that during the warfare period the KDP and PUK were able to learn of their true
parity. I further argue that their endemic peace process, the Koya/Shaqlawa process, allowed
them to utilize what was learned from their previous agreement about ineffective language such
that they were able to create a wisely ambiguous agreement that allowed for renegotiation once
the elites’ incentives allowed for deeper cooperation. This was possible since they were not the
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subjects of coercive mediation which could have pigeon-holed them into language that was too
specific and unachievable.
This ambiguity is a form of the flexibility that Werner and Yuen posit is important to
ensure that both parties do not feel the need to reignite conflict in the future because they have
recourse, such as changing circumstances through negotiation.214 For the Kurds, this ambiguous
agreement language enabled them to deepen their cooperation over the course of several years
rather than all at once; e.g. the establishment of a joint federal project in 2002,215 opening offices
in each other’s regions in 2003,216 and participating in the Iraqi elections in 2004 on a joint
ticket.217 The lengthy deepening of cooperation transformed what had been a negative peace into
a positive peace, which was institutionalized in the community.

The 50-50 Agreement (1992)
The 1992 power sharing agreement had a strict and straight-forward structure in both the
legislative and executive branches. The 105-seat Kurdistan National Assembly was allocated by
the agreement, 50 seats for each party, with the remaining five seats given to the minority
parties. However, plans for future elections for these positions were not made at the time of the
agreement.
In the executive branch, in an attempt to be flexible, the ministries were run by both
parties. Each government department had a minister from one party and a deputy from the other.
While the minister was intended to have greater power than the deputy, the power dynamics
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were such that the minister and deputy had equal power which created deadlock over even the
most menial of decisions.218
The election results between Barzani and Talabani for president of the KRG were so slim
that a second election was deemed necessary; however, they were never held and the office of
president was never activated, in part because of the refusal of the two leaders to hold second
elections. Furthermore, the two leaders declined to be involved in the government formed as a
result of the 50-50 agreement, but they still exerted influence over the ministries. Given that the
leaders were meddling with decisions made by the ministries for the benefit of their own parties
and their refusal to engage in the agreement negotiated, the rigidity of the 50-50 Agreement
created an untenable situation which soon became too brittle to continue to function well.219
In addition to its inflexible nature, the 50-50 Agreement had at least one other major
failure. While the agreement mandated that the parties split their income between them equally,
it did not cede control of the money to the main government. This omission laid the groundwork
for the fallout that would ultimately cause the PUK to attack the KDP in 1994.220
The 50-50 Agreement was a rudimentary power-sharing agreement, one that did not have
the flexibility to withstand the tests of change and disagreement. The ministries were deadlocked
due to the ministers and deputies having equal power and both parties then trying to impose their
wishes. Thus, without the flexibility to adapt to change, or the willingness of the parties to
negotiate, the 50-50 Agreement only had the ability to maintain negative peace, the absence of
conflict, for a short while, stopping a seemingly inevitable conflict for at least two years.
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The Washington Agreement (1998)
After the extensive learning period mentioned above, the Washington Agreement solved
for some of the missteps taken in the creation of the 50-50 Agreement. For instance, the
Washington Agreement included measures for ongoing discussion and negotiation after the final
agreement had been signed, building on the Koya/Shaqlawa meetings which took place prior to
the agreement signing.221
The structure of the Kurdistan Regional Assembly was to be determined by elections,
which were mandated, rather than seats apportioned by the agreement. Thus, as political winds
changed, and party power ebbed and flowed (as demonstrated by the rise of the Gorran party in
2009)222 the legislature would be the measure of democracy that the Kurds were hoping it to be.
Ambiguity in the details about the executive branch was also helpful in allowing them to
create a structure that would work for them. In a post-civil war Kurdistan this was the creation of
two governorates with separate ministries. This ended up being one of the most effective ways of
maintaining and institutionalizing the peace in the immediate aftermath of the conflict and
agreement.223
Even with this ambiguity of structure, the agreement included measures that would assure
eventual integration. For instance, there was an initial deadline for reintegration, but even in that
there was some flexibility. The agreement used phrases such as “on or before” and
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“beginning”—language which allowed the parties to make changes and work on reintegration in
a manner and timeframe which was right for both of them, as long as they could point to some
measure of compliance.224
In addition to solving for the inflexibility of the 50-50 Agreement, the Washington
Agreement tried to account for the adequate sharing of revenue through the creation of a single
minister for revenue and taxation.225 While this part of the agreement was not accomplished
before the Unification Agreement in 2006, the inclusion in the Washington Agreement shows
just how effective the conflict was as a learning period for creating a more effective powersharing agreement.

Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement (2006)
In 2006, the KDP and the PUK determined to reunify their two governorates and in doing
so renegotiated the Washington Agreement, something that would not necessarily have been a
possibility after the 50-50 Agreement. The two parties were willing to negotiate because they
were both trying to gain back some of the reputation they had had with the international
community prior to 1994, and they were trying to position themselves as the only competent and
trustworthy leaders in a newly forming Iraq, having successfully run their own region for many
years. They knew that positioning themselves as a unified front would make both the other Iraqi
parties and the international arbiters more likely to trust them..226 The Kurdistan Regional
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Government Unification Agreement is a good example of how ambiguity in the original
agreement can lead to effective renegotiation that further institutionalizes peace in the region.
The Unification Agreement not only had the endorsement of both the party leaders, as the
1998 agreement had, but their full participation.227 In order to assure that the presidency would
be activated this time, the Unification Agreement created a position of Vice President as part of
the executive branch.228 Additionally, the ministries were unified under the KRG, with each
party in charge of approximately half the ministries—the KDP headed 13 ministries and the PUK
headed 14—each controlling two of the four major ministries, Peshmerga & Finance (KDP),
Justice and Interior (PUK.)229 And, once again drawing on the experience of the past, there was
specific language in the agreement which encouraged the preparation of a regional budget within
one year by the unified KRG.230
The structure of the KNA remained largely unchanged from the Washington Agreement,
but the Unification Agreement created a rotating schedule for the positions of Speaker and Prime
Minister. With every new Assembly, the position of prime minister and speaker were to be from
different parties.231 The designation of a rotating schedule proved most important because the
power of the government lies with the prime minister, and for only one party to consistently be in
control of the most powerful position, could upset the power-sharing agreement as a whole.
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Finally, the Unification Agreement created joint committees in each of the governorates
with members from both the PUK and the KDP.232 The purpose of these committees was to
provide a venue in each of the governorates for resolving any issues that might arise between the
parties. This provision of the Unification Agreement again shows that the learning period was
effective and the language of the agreement was more tailored to increase the institutionalization
of peace in their community. The Kurds created a full committee which was dedicated toward
negotiation to settle conflicts that may have arisen in a period of tumult, instead of defaulting to
conflict.
The Kurdistan Regional Unification Agreement in 2006 is a compelling piece of evidence
for the argument that the contents of an agreement actually do make a difference in fostering
positive peace in a community. The Washington Agreement helped to shape an environment in
which renegotiation instead of conflict was preferable, in part because of the parties’ explicit
commitment towards negotiation over fighting in the wake of outside commitments from the US
to continue to protect the Kurds from Baghdad’s intervention.233 Furthermore, the Unification
Agreement provided a joint project that enabled the two disparate parties to collaborate in
building something new—a unified and vastly more functional government—a core tenet of
positive peace.
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Importance of Explicit Revenue-Sharing Measures
The Kurdish Civil War hinges on one issue more than any other: revenue sharing. In
1992, the KDP-controlled border with Turkey was providing approximately 85 percent of the
Kurdistan Regional Government’s revenues, bringing in approximately 150,000 dollars per day
through taxation of oil trucks and illicit trading.234 The PUK, whose territory bordered Iran, did
not have the same access to revenue, and it was therefore very important to them that they
receive a fair portion of the revenue received by the KDP.
With this knowledge in mind, the 50-50 Agreement tried to ensure that the KDP was
sharing this revenue with the PUK through a mandate that the revenue was split 50-50. But it
was only language in an agreement, and there was no central ministry for finance, or requirement
that the KRG be put in control of the region’s finances. This lack of structural methods for
revenue-sharing prevented transparency and thus fostered distrust among the PUK. While the
KDP assured the PUK that they were receiving their half of the revenue received by the KDP,
the PUK remained unconvinced. In fact, the major substantive reason the PUK cited for starting
the conflict in 1994 was that the KDP was withholding revenue. This claim illustrates that in
addition to mutual optimism for war (the information problem), the PUK was likely also fearing
the KDP’s steady increase in power over time if the revenue sharing was not reformed (the
commitment problem.)
Having fought a war which revealed to both sides that they were rather evenly matched,
the Washington Agreement included explicit measures for revenue sharing. First it was
established that the Higher Coordination Committee (HCC)—a committee established to oversee
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the reconciliation between the parties—would oversee the flow of funds between the two parties
while an interim government was selected. Then, the responsibility of collecting and distributing
the revenue in the region would be delegated to a single Ministry of Revenue and Taxation
which would do so at the direction of the Kurdistan National Assembly.235
Although the measures put in place in the Washington Agreement were not enacted
before 2006 due to the choice to administer two separate governorates between 1998 and 2006,
the lessons learned between 1998 and 2006 allowed for an even better, more specific
arrangement for finances in 2006. This included specifics as to who and how the budget should
be prepared—by the Kurdistan Regional Government approved by the Kurdistan National
Assembly—as well as how revenue allocation was to be administered between the parties.236
On the whole, the two periods of learning engrained in the two parties how important
specificity and transparency in the arrangements for revenue sharing were for the maintenance
and institutionalization of peace. It was only through the two learning periods, the first after the
50-50 Agreement, when a shoddy revenue-sharing arrangement ultimately led to fighting, and
the second after the Washington Agreement, that the two parties could reach an arrangement that
was satisfactory to both parties. Revenue-sharing was the main grievance which launched the
two parties into violence in 1994, so finding a solution to prevent a similar resurgence of this
grievance is crucial for developing a long-standing, positive peace.
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Two Governorates, Two Peshmergas—How post-1998 administrative style set the Iraqi Kurds up
for Peace and Governing Success
Stansfield has noted previously that keeping two governorates was an inadvertently
genius way to not only keep the peace, but provide a sort of school for developing double the
number of experienced civil servants than would otherwise have been available.237 Separate
governorates themselves did have some level of effectiveness in the preservation of the peace
because both parties were focused on providing services to the populations under their control,
and in this case that took nearly all the concentration of the two parties to learn how to govern
effectively because they had never had this opportunity before.238 However, Stansfield’s analysis
does not allow for two circumstances.
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Figure 3: Map of KDP and PUK Governorates, 2003239

First, Stansfield does not discuss how effective keeping the peshmergas separate and
supporting each party was in promoting peace. Civil wars are generally prolonged due to a
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commitment problem on the part of the weaker party. They fear that should they surrender their
military the ruling party will immediately renege on the agreement that has been made. Because
this is a civil war, the issue of party militaries needs to be addressed. Before the 50-50
Agreement, the two parties were not engaged in a civil war with each other, instead they were
involved in parallel civil wars with the Iraqi government.
When initial power-sharing government was created, the issue of peshmerga control was
not discussed as part of the arrangements. Although, there had been some rumors of peshmerga
unification as early 1991, these seemed half-hearted, and commitments were never made.240 The
unwillingness from all parties to cede military control could reflect their wariness of each of the
other Kurdish parties which was only overwhelmed by their strong desire to create an
autonomous region. But the fact that peshmerga unification was not a serious part of the
conversation in 1992 meant that they were prepared and somewhat primed to fight when they
were unable to resolve a disagreement about revenue through negotiation in 1994.
At the close of the conflict, the Washington Agreement did address, to a certain degree,
the unification of peshmerga. The commitment was once again half-hearted, and left mostly up
to the discretion of the parties. However, in implementation, a unified peshmerga was not
pursued, and as a result of keeping their separate militaries, the Kurds stumbled onto a
particularly effective way of maintaining the peace: ending the conflict like an interstate war.
Even at the end of the conflict, the PUK and the KDP were so well matched that there
wasn’t a “weaker” party to disband their troops, as we would expect in a civil war situation.
Instead, each party kept their own peshmergas which became an insurance measure against the
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other party.241 Thus, the Kurdish Civil War ended in a way that mirrored the end of an interstate
conflict between minor parties. Each military supported one of the two distinct governorates that
blossomed after the signing of the Washington Agreement giving the parties the ability to ensure
compliance with the agreement through violent means, if necessary.
While keeping separate peshmergas was an unexpectedly effective way of maintaining
peace between the two parties, so was the unwritten agreement to divide the territory into two
separately run governorates, the PUK administering Sulaymaniyah and territories to the east, and
the KDP administering Erbil and territories to the north. The only thread connecting them was
the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) which was not especially active during the period when
the governorates were administered separately.242
Second, Stansfield argues that while separate governorates preserved the peace, he did
not see a circumstance where there could be unification.243 However, he wrote this analysis in
2003 before the increased talks between the PUK and KDP in the wake of the US invasion of
Iraq and the new discussion about the future of Iraq, a discussion in which both parties wanted a
part. In some small part, the separate governorates were a byproduct of a more flexible
agreement, one that enabled the parties to have an additional learning period about their
capabilities and the skills required to administer a semi-democratic region.
In the wake of the Washington Agreement, having two governorates both distracted each
party from fighting in the near term and in the long term enabled both parties to train people in
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the practice of running a government.244 Thus, when the time was right to renegotiate, after the
2003 invasion shifted internal political equations, there were people who were trained in the
process of running a government.
In 1992, the Kurds had never run a democratic government, nor had they really ever had
a government of their own. So, the way they chose to build a government was based to a certain
extent on what they had observed in other countries, or read about. The learning period from
1998-2005 for both parties to grasp the mechanics and difficulties that came with running a
government responsible for providing goods and services—and therefore accountable to—a
population was of paramount importance for the two parties. It enabled them to better plan for
reunification when the time came to do so in 2006.
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CONCLUSION

My analysis of conflict and peace in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from 1991 to 2006,
shows that both of the competing scholarships on peace—institutionalist camp and the selection
camp—have some power in explaining the conflict between the PUK and the KDP, both camps
bringing part of the solution for lasting peace. The selection camp demonstrates that lasting
peace is more likely when the two parties agree on the outcomes possible, and demonstrate it
through the agreement language leading to negative peace in the very least. The institutionalist
camp demonstrates that the strategic choice of language is powerful in enabling negative peace
to flourish. Both of these camps together explain more positive peace or greater cooperation in
the community.
I show that power-sharing agreements, when informed by the context in which they must
function have great power towards fostering the cooperation necessary for achieving positive
peace. The Kurdish case allows us to examine this through the three agreements which we have
to study, each of which demonstrates the tangible institutionalization of peace, or lack thereof, in
the community.
In 1992, the Kurds were largely naïve about the way that a government should function.
They were building democratic structures from the ground up with little aid from more
established democratic powers, and even less personal experience in running a government. This
led to some avoidable, but certainly understandable mistakes. First that the 50-50 Agreement was
not flexible enough to deal with changes that would inevitably come. Second, neither party truly
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trusted the evidence of popularity provided by the elections in part because they had no
experience with them.
With their history of nearly 20 years of internecine animosity, and a background in
fighting for power with the government in Baghdad, experience taught them that conflict was the
only way to identify a top power. Their mutual optimism for success was quickly banished
through the conflict, which served as a learning period during which the parties learned two
things.
First, that they were evenly matched in every respect no matter who was backing them.
Having not fought one another before this was an important lesson to learn. Second, that when
they were establishing a regional government and not fighting Baghdad, their external backers
had ulterior motives which did not necessarily match the motives of the Kurdish parties. As a
result, their external backers were acting more as spoilers for the peace process than as aids.
Without the conflict, it is unlikely that the parties could have learned that particular piece of
information as well or as quickly.
The Koya/Shaqlawa process and ultimately the Washington Agreement demonstrate that
the two parties had learned something from the previous agreement as well as their conflict. The
endemic Koya/Shaqlawa process enabled the parties to reach understandings for creating
agreement language which enabled a lasting peace agreement. So, while it had concrete goals,
the Washington Agreement did not try to mandate how the executive was structured which
meant that the parties had the flexibility to arrive at an arrangement, through further negotiation,
which suited both of them. In this case, they established separate governorates and kept their
militaries, inadvertently stumbling on a particularly effective method of avoiding the
commitment problem in civil wars because both parties had a method to enforce compliance with
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the major pieces of the agreement such as revenue sharing and the commitment not to support
the PKK.
For eight years, the Washington Agreement’s ambiguity and the subsequent creation of
two separately administered governorates provided double benefits. First, the two parties were so
focused on providing adequate goods and services to those under their rule that they were
distracted from fighting one another. Second, twice as many people were trained in bureaucracy
and democratic-esque structures so that when unification came, there were many qualified
people to be able to fill the roles necessary in a region that had once had not a single experienced
bureaucrat.
Finally, the Kurdistan Regional Unification Agreement of 2006 shows us just how well
the Koya/Shaqlawa process and Washington Agreement set the Kurdistan Region up for deeper
cooperation and positive peace between the KDP and the PUK when incentives changed for their
leaders after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The lessons learned from 1992 again appear in this
agreement, the division of the ministries is more flexible, and there is better division of the
ministries between the parties providing an escape from the bureaucratic deadlock that came
from the division made in the 50-50 Agreement. But perhaps the most meaningful steps towards
positive peace was the establishment of joint committees in each governorate which were meant
to provide a place to negotiate disagreements between members of each party.
Not only did the Unification Agreement bring two parties together to work in a functional
government after decades of animosity, but they were aware of the possible friction that
unification might cause even then and provided a way for diffusing the conflicts without
resorting to violence. While the two parties are still at odds with one another, the cooperation
between then runs deep and that is evident through these three power-sharing agreements.
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This thesis demonstrates the influence of context-driven power-sharing agreements for
developing, establishing, and institutionalizing positive peace in communities which may have
been involved in heated internecine conflicts for long periods of time.
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APPENDIX I: TIMELINE OF THE KURDS IN IRAQ 1940-2009
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Hiwa (Hope) party established in Iraq, Mulla Mustafa Barzani placed
under house arrest for revolutionary activities245
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Hiwa party collapses, Barzani Rebellion collapses, Mulla Mustafa
exiled to Iran247
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Kurdish Republic of Mahabad declared in Iran249
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Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) established in Iraq, Mulla Mustafa
elected president in absentia.250
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Mahabad Republic falls, Mulla Mustafa and best troops forced to
withdraw to the Soviet Union “Retreat of the Five Hundred"251
1950
Ibrahim Ahmed elected secretary general of KDP, beginning of
divisions between KDP politburo (erudite, intelligentsia) and the
conservative Barzani faction.252
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Qazi Mohammad, leader of the Iranian Kurds, established Kurdish
Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I)248
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Mulla Mustafa returns to Iraq from Soviet Union at invitation of
Abdul Karim Qassim, new president of Iraq253
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the March Manifesto (March Agreement)262
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Command KDP led by Barzani's sons and the Patriotic Union of
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PKK formed in Turkey266
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cancer.267
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Iran mediates agreement between Talabani and Barzani, agreement
signed by Jalal Talabani & Idris Mustafa Barzani (son of Mullah
Mustafa) agreement shaky after Idris passes away in Jan 1987. Lays
the groundwork for the Kurdistan Front.277
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1991

4

15

UNSC Resolution 688289
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Task Force Encourage Hope (part of OPC) launched to construct a
series of resettlement camps where dislocated civilians found food,
shelter, and a secure environment.290
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19

UN Guards Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI) UN forces based in Iraq to
protect the UN humanitarian missions in Iraq, involved soldiers from
35 different countries.291
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Humanitarian relief efforts taken over by the UNHCR292
Links between PKK and Baghdad through the early 1990s comes to
light. PKK gave Baghdad intel on Iraqi Kurds293

1992
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1992

5

First general election and establishment of 1st KRG government, 105
elected members of the Kurdistan National Assembly (later renamed
the parliament). Turnout 90% of eligible voters. Results favored the
KDP294
PUK refuses to accept results of the general election295
50-50 Agreement between KDP and PUK to avoid civil war296
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PKK puts embargo on trade between Turkey and northern Iraq297
Turkey launches attack on PKK298
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PUK, & KDP (IKF) join Turkish attack on PKK299
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PKK surrenders to IKF, specifically PUK300

1993

Iran on good terms with both Iraqi Kurdish parties, consulates in both
regions301

1993

Parties fall out over division of oil revenues (PUK suspicious the KDP
was hoarding the money earned from oil smuggling through the KDP
controlled territory into Turkey) and also concerns over control of the
major cities. Particularly that PUK had control of Erbil where the
assembly met.302
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Brief unilateral cease-fire between PKK and Turkey303
Tensions reach their height between KDP and PUK. Due to land
disputes over area northeast of Sulaymaniyah, fighting begins.304
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3

KDP takes Dohuk, Zakho and Ammadiya from PUK305
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First round fighting ends, more than 400 killed in the month. Second
round clashes begin.306
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More than 600 people killed in second round clashes between PUK
and KDP307
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4

KDP and PUK announce that they are still unified against the Iraqi
Government308
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7
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France hosts peace talks in Paris (brokered by US and UK), two weeks
of negotiation, parties reach an agreement, have to wait on approval
from party leaders (Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani)309
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PUK and KDP Clash sporadically until August 18310
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1994

7
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Paris peace talks conclude, because visas were not allowed by Turkey
and the agreement died311

1994

8

15

Talabani and Barzani sign agreement in official KNA meeting, lasts
less than 72 hours312
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23

Sporadic clashes between PUK and KDP end for a time313
"Alliance pact” or “Year 2000 agreement" both parties agree not to
fight again until the year 2000, agreement did not last even until the
end of the month. PUK captures village of Kasnazan near Erbil, and
then retake Erbil by the end of 1994314
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Fights break out between PUK and KDP over disputes in tax
collection315
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PUK supports the PKK, which had previously clashed with the
KDP316
PUK and KDP fight, after the worst of it, PUK takes Erbil317
Informal cease fire between PUK and KDP ends fighting which began
1/1/95318
Heavy fighting between PUK and KDP begins319
Heavy fighting between PUK and KDP ends320
Turkish army launches major incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan on the eve
of the Kurdish New Year Nowruz, Operation Steel321
PUK and KDP clash for 24 hours, at least 100 killed322
KDP calls for temporary truce w/ PUK, brokered by Turkey323
Oil for Food program in Iraq established324
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Operation Steel ends, Turkey withdraws325
Over two days, PUK and KDP meet on neutral ground to extend KNA
mandate for another year326

1995
1995
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8

1995
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7
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Turkey invades Kurdistan to attack PKK positions in the country327
PUK launches preemptive attack against KDP, rationalizing through
asserting the KDP would have launched an attack within a short
time328
Turkish invasion concludes329
Initial Drogheda talk begin brokered by US (Turkey and UK also
involved)330

1995

8

15

PUK and KDP at US brokered talks in Dublin, Ireland reach an
agreement to demilitarize Erbil, turn over by the KDP of customs
revenues to joint bank account and reconvening of KRG331
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PKK attacks KDP to break up peace talks between PUK and KDP332
Drogheda talks resume, attempt to mediate full agreement based on
progress made in August talks333
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Peace talks in Ireland conclude without agreement334
Iran brokered peace talks between KDP and PUK in Tehran,
supposedly reach some agreement, but details are scarce and
inconclusive335
US sponsored peace talks resume336
US sponsored peace talks conclude again without reaching
settlement.337

325

“Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline”; Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 222.
“Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
327
“Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
328
Waisy, “The Roots of the Iraqi Kurdish Internal Rivalries, Conflicts and Peace Process 1964-2000,” 225; “Iraqi
Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
329
“Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
330
Waisy, “The Roots of the Iraqi Kurdish Internal Rivalries, Conflicts and Peace Process 1964-2000,” 225; Yildiz,
The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 48–49; Jarrah, “Iraqi Kurdistan: Peace Talks Fail”; “Iraqi
Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
331
“Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline”; Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 49; Waisy, “The
Roots of the Iraqi Kurdish Internal Rivalries, Conflicts and Peace Process 1964-2000,” 226; Prados, “The Kurds:
Stalemate in Iraq.”
332
Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 32; Černy, Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International
Relations, 191; Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 216; “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile Timeline.”
333
Prados, “The Kurds: Stalemate in Iraq”; Jarrah, “Iraqi Kurdistan: Peace Talks Fail”; Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq:
The Past, Present and Future.
334
“Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline”; Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 49; Prados, “The
Kurds: Stalemate in Iraq.”
335
Prados, “The Kurds: Stalemate in Iraq,” 5.
336
“Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
337
“Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
326

civ
1996

Mediation led by Turkey in the presence of the UK & US–produces
Ankara declaration which had 22 articles. Only 5 of which KDP
accepted. PUK accepted all.338

1996

4

18

US State dept official Robert Deutsch travels to Northern Iraq to try to
broker a settlement339

1996

5

29

PUK and KDP officials agree to extend the term of the assembly of
the power-sharing agreement340

1996
1996

7
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16

US petitions sides to stop fighting, again did not hold341
PUK allows Iranian troops to go after Iranian Kurds which had been
using their bases in the area in return for the support of the Iranian
government.342
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8

1996

8

16

PUK breaks year-long armistice, attacks KDP, giving KDP reason to
turn to Saddam for support. Engage in the most serious fighting since
ceasefire in 1995344

1996

8

22

1996

8

28

Barzani asks Saddam to send Iraqi National guards to help take back
Erbil345
PUK and KDP agree to new US brokered cease fire and work towards
more comprehensive settlement346

1996

8

31

1996

9

4

1996

9

9

338

Operation Provide Comfort ends, US withdraws personnel, NGO
employees343

Iraqi help arrives and the KDP quashes the PUK, taking back control
of Erbil347
KDP declares amnesty for PUK members who want to return to their
homes if they sign a declaration of surrender and pay "caution
money"348
KDP takes Sulaymaniyah from PUK349
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Ankara Process (US, Turkey and Iran broker) denounced by Iran350
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10
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PUK takes back Sulaymaniyah with Iranian support + two other
towns351
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10

23

Ceasefire and the 10-point agreement (US, Turkey, Kurds) Peace
monitoring force implemented352
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1

1

Operation Northern Watch begins353
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16

Ankara process resumes, but KDP official is killed and the KDP pulls
out. Note: in all negotiations the KDP wanted Erbil as the center of
power which benefited them politically and PUK did not want that
because they no longer had any control over Erbil354
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5
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5

14

Murder of local KDP leader leads to temporary breakdown of peace
talks between KDP and PUK. PUK denies responsibility for the
killing355
Turkish Army signs agreement with the KDP to patrol Iraq/Turkey
border356
50,000 Turkish troops invade Iraq to support KDP and against the
PKK (Operation Sledgehammer)357
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350

23

PUK withdraws from Ankara Process358
PUK has increased relationships with Iraqi Central government to
secure its position359
Fighting between PKK and KDP results in considerable losses for
KDP360
Turkish army in cooperation with the KDP attacked the PUK:
"Operation Twilight"361
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1997
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18

After fighting for 5 days, PUK and KDP agree to US brokered
ceasefire. Signing of the agreement is followed by some skirmishes in
which members of both sides killed.364
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11

24

Fighting continues between PUK and KDP, but KDP declares
unilateral cease-fire365
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2

1998

6

1998

7
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9

362

After PUK makes significant gains, Turkey intervenes on the KDP's
side362
Turkey announces end of Operation Twilight, PUK launches military
campaign "Storm of Revenge" against KDP on the heels of Turkish
withdrawal.363

Relationship between Turkey and KDP strengthens366
Talabani and Barzani exchange letters leading to a series of meetings
to discuss normalization measures, Koya-Shaqlawa meetings367
12

PUK and KDP start talks including confidence building measures,
ceasefire enforcement, release of prisoners and establishment of joint
committee to ensure implementation of SCR 986. PUK and KDP
working out lower level concerns first, meeting every two weeks.
Koya-Shaqlawa meetings368
Talks between PUK and KDP deadlock over main issues, parties stop
meeting as frequently369

20

US invites leaders of PUK and KDP to US for negotiations on a final,
comprehensive peace settlement. David Walsh (State dept) goes to
regions to issue invitations370
As a sign of good faith, PUK and KDP exchange more than 200
prisoners from conflict371
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1998

9

17

Peace agreement reached, brokered by US. Called the Washington
agreement. Post-civil war there were two seats of executive power
KDP administered in Erbil, PUK administered from Sulaymaniyah.
After PUK makes significant gains, Turkey intervenes on the KDP's
side372
Turkey monitors situation after US brokers Washington Agreement373
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Leaders of the Iraqi Kurdish factions meet in northern Iraq to discuss
implementation of the peace plan375
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Turkey captures Ocalan, leader of the PKK376
Masoud Barzani accuses PUK of helping PKK in breach of
agreement377
PUK holds KDP responsible for non-implementation of the
agreement378
2000
Turkish and US embassy officials visit Iraqi Kurdistan. At this time
PUK and KDP reaffirm commitment to Washington Agreement379
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Kurdish officials meet with vice president Al Gore in Washington380
Talabani meets with Turkish PM, in the Turkish capital381
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PUK and PKK fight382
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3

Masoud Barzani meets with Turkish officials383
Barham Sali (Head of PUK govt) meets with U.S. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld384
PUK and PKK fight again.385
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PKK fighters move back to Iraqi Kurdistan straining Washington
Agreement.374
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KDP/ Turkey relations cool386
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Talabani publicly issues invitation for US/UK to invade Iraq from
PUK's territory389
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PUK and KDP publish draft of joint federal project, draws warning
from Turks390
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2003
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8

Kurdistan National Assembly resumes, both parties participate391
Draft constitution for Iraqi accepted in the regional assembly392
Operation Northern Watch ends393
KDP and PUK open offices in each other's regions as a sign of
reconciliation394
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15

KDP and PUK declare intention to join the US invasion forces in the
anticipated war against Iraq395
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US invasion of Iraq, been crucial in the endeavor to normalize
relations between the 2 KRG administrations396
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Join US and Kurdish troops take over Mosul and Kirkuk397
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Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created398
Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) formed399

386

Secret meeting between Barzani, Talabani, and President George W.
Bush; PUK and KDP set up a "joint operation room" to deal with
terrorism in the region387
PUK, KDP join talks with other Iraqi groups about the future of Iraq in
the event of a US-led military intervention388
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2003

11

21

2004

Oil for food and UNGCI terminated400
CPA passes law of administration for the state of Iraq in the
transitional period, recognized the KRG as a federal region of Iraq by
legalization all its institutions built since 1992401

2004

3

8

New Iraqi Governing council signs a provisional constitution (the
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